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6.1  Introduction 
Production of services now dominates economic activity in the United 
States. Whether hailed as the dawn of a new “information economy” 
or deplored as the key symptom of  American industrial decline, the 
trend in employment is itself beyond dispute. By the 1980s, only one 
U.S.  worker  in  four was  employed  in  the sectors of  the economy 
producing tangible outputs-manufacturing  plus mining, construction, 
and agriculture. But the increasing role of service-sector employment 
is by no means unique to the United States. Similar trends have been 
reshaping the economies of the other industrialized nations and even 
many less-developed countries. 
Given this dramatic economic transformation at home and abroad, 
it may  seem natural to find increasing attention on the part of U.S. 
policymakers to international competition in service activities. How- 
ever, unlike domestic production, trade among nations is still domi- 
nated by exchange of  tangible goods. Moreover, while the role of in- 
ternational service transactions is already significant and while some 
sectors show potential for rapid growth, the service transactions prom- 
inent in international commerce are quite different from the activities 
typical of the domestic “service economy.” 
In recent decades, national markets for tangible goods have become 
increasingly integrated, and virtually all U.S. goods-producing indus- 
tries have experienced significant  growth in both exports and competing 
imports. However, the rapid domestic expansion of service industries 
reflects  the rising importance  of  health,  education, housing,  public 
administration, and other largely untraded service categories in final 
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demand. The current U.S. interest in international service competition 
is focused on an entirely different group of industries, especially those 
supplying information-based  business  services. These industries are 
small relative to total domestic service-sector employment. And, al- 
though some part of their domestic output is “traded”  internationally, 
that is, produced by residents of one nation for purchase by those of 
another, U.S. firms serve international markets primarily via local sales 
of foreign affiliates rather than exports. 
6.1.1 
Long ignored by trade officials as a generic issue, international com- 
petition  in  services has achieved high visibility on the global policy 
agenda just a few years after the subject was first raised by the United 
States. At the November 1982 ministerial meeting of the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United States trade represen- 
tative called for inclusion of  service transactions in forthcoming mul- 
tilateral  negotiations. l  But  the  developing  countries  were  strongly 
opposed, and the ministers merely recommended that members with 
an interest in service issues undertake their own national studies, ex- 
change information, and report their results at the 1984 GATT session.* 
Under continuing pressure from the United States, GATT members 
agreed in September 1986 to include services in the new Uruguay round 
of multilateral trade negotiations. Yet there remains widespread skep- 
ticism  regarding progress  on service issues.  Abroad,  the early  and 
persistent enthusiasm of the United States for negotiations on services 
has caused U.S. trading partners to assume, perhaps incorrectly, that 
the United States will emerge as the major beneficiary of any liberal- 
ization achieved in this area. 
The developing nations, led by Brazil and India, actively resisted 
inclusion of  services on the GATT agenda. This resistance was over- 
come through a compromise that will keep services on a separate ne- 
gotiating track from merchandise trade, but the developing nations are 
nonetheless suspicious of the outcome. While the other industrialized 
nations did eventually support the U.S. initiative on services, few trade 
officials abroad appear to view the prospects with any degree of en- 
thusiasm.  And  even among the U.S. policymakers  who pressed  so 
vigorously for GATT negotiations on services, opinion remains divided 
on the best way to bring conflicting national policies toward services 
under the discipline of GATT rules. 
Analysts in some U.S. government agencies worry that the GATT 
initiative on services may  be  premature.  An  extreme  example is a 
recently  issued  report of  the Office of Technology Assessment  that 
openly suggests U.S. officials may have erred, perhaps because their 
decisions were based on inadequate data. The report’s summary sec- 
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tion gives this evaluation of the U.S. decision to promote negotiations 
on services: 
Consider, specifically, the decision by the United States prior to 
the 1982 GATT Ministerial to place a high priority on services in the 
next round-a  decision taken in the midst of a period of deterioration 
in the ability of the world trading system to manage the impacts on 
trade in goods of nontariff barriers,  bilateralism,  and the national 
industrial policies that have become standard in many parts of the 
world.  Would  a better grasp of the prospects for U.S. exports of 
services have led to a different approach to the new round? Certainly 
the poor quality and coverage of the data impair the ability of poli- 
cymakers to gauge the importance of services trade-as  a whole, on 
a  sector-by-sector basis,  or bilaterally.  (US. Congress,  Office of 
Technology Assessment 1986, 7) 
6.1.2  Analysis of Competition in Services 
Although there is broad agreement on the poor quality of  services 
data, progress in clarifying the nation’s policy goals has been hampered 
also by lack of  analytical guidance. Given the huge theoretical and 
empirical literature on international competition in goods, surprisingly 
little attention has been devoted until recently to international com- 
petition in services. In most empirical research on international trade, 
services are simply ignored or are treated as nontradable goods. The- 
orists, in contrast, often imply or state without elaboration that trade 
in  services is conceptually no different from trade in goods, so that 
standard analyses in areas such as comparative advantage and gains 
from trade apply equally to international commerce in  services. 
Each approach has some economic justification. For the classic text- 
book example of haircuts and for many other types of services impor- 
tant in domestic production, foreign competition is indeed a negligible 
influence. Yet  some important services, including shipping, transpor- 
tation, and a variety of financial services, have been actively traded 
for centuries; for these, the determinants of trade and the gains from 
trade are fundamentally similar to those for merchandise trade. 
But given the evident heterogeneity of the activities included in the 
category,  does “services”  even constitute a useful analytic classifi- 
cation, or is it merely a convenient label for a statistical residual?3 The 
political and economic issues raised by  international competition among 
producers of tangible goods have in practice proved far from simple to 
resolve, despite ample theoretical and empirical guidance; consider- 
ation of services introduces additional layers of complexity. These re- 
flect the intangible nature of the outputs of many service activities, the 
locational and temporal constraints linking service providers to con- 
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ities. Analysts have only begun to grapple with the implications of these 
special features. In  terms  of  both  measurement  and interpretation, 
analysis of service issues is still in its infancy. 
All this raises obvious questions about the new GATT negotiations. 
Do policymakers have a sufficient knowledge base to shape interna- 
tional rules  that will promote global efficiency? And  do U.S. trade 
officials have a sufficient knowledge base to identify and pursue the 
nation’s own economic interests in the area of service competition? If 
not, what can be gained by putting U.S. influence and prestige on the 
line to bring services into the GATT framework? Is the services item 
on the GATT agenda truly a generic issue, or is it fundamentally an 
attempt to improve the international position of  a small set of  U.S.- 
based multinational firms in a few ind~stries?~ 
This paper  surveys the main issues and evidence relating to U.S. 
international competition in  services. The next  section reviews the 
forces that have catapulted the services issue to the top of  the U.S. 
agenda for forthcoming GATT negotiations. 
Section 6.3 addresses what is meant by  services and by  trade in 
services, focusing on key ambiguities of definition. The discussion em- 
phasizes similarities and differences within the service sector as con- 
ventionally defined and between “services”  and tangible “goods.” 
Sections 6.4 and 6.5 interpret evidence on the growing importance 
of services in U.S.  production and in international transactions. This 
evidence indicates the extent to which internationally traded services 
are unrepresentative of the services in domestic production. 
Section 6.6 evaluates the influence of various types of national pol- 
icies on international competition in services and compares barriers to 
services competition with nontariff distortions of merchandise trade. 
Section 6.7 analyzes some of the choices facing U.S.  officials and 
evaluates the advantages of alternative negotiating approaches in deal- 
ing with services issues. 
The final section sums up principal conclusions emerging from the 
survey and emphasizes the links between international competition in 
services and other international issues on the policy agenda. 
6.2  Services in the Policy Spotlight 
For more than a generation, the majority of U.S.  workers have been 
employed in  service-producing  sectors; for well over a century, em- 
ployment in the service-producing sectors has been growing steadily 
as a share of the U.S. labor force (see tables 6.3-6.5  below). Thus, 
while the United  States can accurately  be  described as a  “service 
economy,” this is hardly a recent development. Why then has the issue 
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suddenly as a top U. S. priority for the Uruguay round? The burgeoning 
interest on the part of policymakers and the U.S. business community 
reflects several independent developments, each of which has gener- 
ated some domestic support for market-opening measures in this area. 
The first development is increasing concern  in the United  States 
about the nation’s performance in international markets. Until the end 
of the 1960s, the technology gap between the United States and other 
industrialized nations appeared to provide a permanent advantage over 
foreign  competitors,  especially  in  the  high-technology  industries. 
Through massive research and development (R&D) expenditures, U.  S. 
firms created a steady stream of new products and processes. These 
innovations allowed American manufacturing to remain internationally 
competitive, even given labor costs far higher than those abroad. But 
the technology gap narrowed with a speed that few anticipated. Through 
their global investments, American companies played a major role in 
the process. 
In 1972, the United States recorded its first postwar deficit on mer- 
chandise trade. While the 1972 trade deficit of  $2 billion seems insig- 
nificant relative to those of recent years, it stimulated questions about 
the course of the U.S. economy and its future position in world markets. 
The accompanying employment shift toward services, while not a new 
development,  suggested the possibility  that  U .S. international com- 
parative advantage was shifting from goods to services. 
This impression was strengthened by U.S. balance of payments data 
that revealed a growing surplus in the “services”  component of the 
current account. As U.S. merchandise trade performance deterioriated 
rapidly in the first half  of  the  1980s, services continued to make a 
significant positive contribution. As recently as 1982, the U.S. surplus 
on service transactions was large enough to reverse a sizable deficit 
on merchandise trade, so that the United States still showed a global 
surplus in the broader category of  “goods and services” trade (see 
table  6.1). From this, some analysts inferred  that increased market 
access abroad for U.S. service industries could further enhance their 
contribution to overall U.S. current account perf~rmance.~ 
Ironically, the healthy growth in the U.S.  surplus on services was 
due mainly to increases in net earnings on foreign investments at a 
time of unusually high interest rates. Since then, interest rates world- 
wide have fallen dramatically. Moreover, the U.S. net investment po- 
sition has reversed, with the United  States emerging as the leading 
borrower in international capital markets. Accordingly, the contribu- 
tion of investment income to U.S. current account performance is likely 
to become negative in the near future. 
In contrast, as detailed in table 6.2, the types of service exports most 
likely to rise  as a consequence  of  improved market access abroad Table 6.1  U.S. Current Account by Major Component, 1977-85  (billions of  dollars) 
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Table 6.2  U.S. Business Services Trade by Component, 1977-85 (billions 
of dollars) 
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Exports  3.8 
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1986, table 41. 
Note: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
constitute a very minor portion of the relevant totals. Thus, even highly 
favorable conditions can be expected to have only a modest effect on 
the aggregate international position of the United States, although such 
conditions would provide substantial benefits to a number of U.S. firms. 
While  some  proponents  of  GATT  negotiations  on  services  have 
stressed the expansion of  service trade as a potential replacement for 
lost market share in manufactured products, others have emphasized 
complementarity with merchandise trade. In a variety of service ac- 
tivities that include distribution, training, repair, telecommunications, 
computer software, construction, and leasing, market access in  ser- 
vices enhances market opportunities in related merchandise transac- 
tions.6 This linkage implies that barriers to international competition 
in services may in effect constitute an important category of nontariff 
barrier to international competition in goods, especially manufactured 
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An additional stimulus for attention to services arises from the na- 
tional debate on “deindustrialization”  of the American economy. At 
a time when U.S. manufacturing employment shows little promise of 
growth, expansion of  the service industries represents an alternative 
means to improve the nation’s economic prospects.  Yet  the forecast 
that newly created service jobs will replace jobs lost in manufacturing 
is itself controversial. 
Optimists focus on a relatively narrow set of knowledge-based ser- 
vice activities, including ones closely linked to high-technology man- 
ufacturing.  While  some of  these sectors have indeed  enjoyed  rapid 
growth in Iecent years, their size relative to the broad  aggregate of 
services is quite small, both in the domestic market and in international 
transactions. Moreover, further decline in the size of the U.S. manu- 
facturing sector is likely to slow or even reverse the growth of  asso- 
ciated  service activities as well.  And  U.S. labor unions, which are 
concentrated in manufacturing industries, point ominously to the low 
average earnings in many types of service employment and to the lower 
average rate of productivity increase in services relative to that in the 
goods-producing sectors.’ 
Support for including services in future GATT negotiations has also 
come from the U.S. public officials charged with forming and imple- 
menting the nation’s policies toward trade.  To  many  policymakers, 
services represent a promising area for continuing U.S.  efforts to main- 
tain open world markets.  Negotiations  on services could extend the 
discipline of  GATT rules to a new and important category of  trans- 
actions and might also help maintain the forward momentum of the 
liberalization process at a time when the prospect of further progress 
on merchandise trade issues appears dim. Anticipated trade and em- 
ployment gains from increased service exports could help revitalize 
flagging political support at home for maintaining open markets (Fek- 
etekuty and Krause 1986, 89). 
Finally, a major part of the impetus for the recent U.S.  emphasis on 
service issues has come directly from the industries and specific firms 
with an important economic stake in serving international markets. 
Large international firms in insurance and other financial services ac- 
tivities and in business support services such as accounting, law, tele- 
communications, and  data processing have actively promoted  U.S. 
initiatives in the area of services. In many cases, U.S. firms expect 
their best customers abroad to be the foreign affiliates of major domestic 
clients. Thus, the global expansion of competition in services is in part 
a reflection of the earlier globalization of U.S.  manufacturing industries. 
In pressing their case for increased access to foreign markets, the 
interested firms and industry associations usually make no distinction 
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locally to customers abroad by foreign affiliates of U.S. companies. 
Yet the two modes of serving foreign markets need to be separated for 
purposes of policy formation. Both types of  transactions can provide 
substantial benefits to the U.S. economy. They will, however, generate 
quite different effects on domestic employment and income distribution. 
Moreover, improved access for international sales via foreign sub- 
sidiaries is fundamentally not a trade issue at all, but rather a matter 
of national policy abroad toward direct foreign investments by U.  S. 
firms. While consideration of  trade in services already represents a 
significant extension of the GATT mandate beyond its current domain, 
the inclusion of service activities of foreign affiliates of U.S.  firms would 
entail still a further expansion of GATT jurisdiction.* This initiative 
comes at a time when the GATT has been less than notably successful 
in  its traditional  work of  maintaining open world  markets for mer- 
chandise trade. 
In  sum, while a number  of  firms evidently  anticipate  substantial 
benefits from U.S. action on services, the national stake in the issue, 
whether in absolute terms or relative to other issues confronting mem- 
bers  of  the GATT,  is less clear.  Also, at least part of  the broader 
enthusiasm for expanding U.S. market access in services reflects a 
superficial understanding of the role and importance of services in U.S. 
domestic production and in the nation’s international transactions. Has 
liberalizing international competition in services been ranked too high 
on the nation’s policy agenda? We  return to this question at the end 
of the paper. 
6.3  Analytical Issues 
Despite continuing discussion of the nation’s metamorphosis into a 
“service economy” and, more recently, of the growing importance of 
U.S. international competition in services, only meager attention has 
been paid to precisely what activities are entailed or exactly how these 
activities enter into international commerce. This section focuses on 
the fundamental issue of  what is meant by services, emphasizing sim- 
ilarities and differences within the industries conventionally grouped 
together as “services” and between the categories of  “services”  and 
tangible “goods.” 
6.3.1  How Services Differ 
Which are the industries included within the broad category of ser- 
vices? In terms of domestic employment, government (federal, state, 
and local) is by far the largest among U.S.  service industries, obviously 
one for which international competition is not a pressing concern. Other 
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public utilities,  wholesale and retail trade, health, and financial and 
business  services.9 It is in the last category that the  United  States 
apparently hopes to make major gains via access to foreign markets. 
But in terms of international trade, travel and transportation currently 
account for the lion’s share of total U.S. receipts from all  “service” 
transactions (excluding income from direct foreign investment; see ta- 
bles 6.1 and 6.2). 
Although a number of  scholars have attempted to identify the es- 
sential features that separate services from other economic activities, 
the inherent heterogeneity of the category implies that there will be 
important exceptions to any allegedly common feature. Heterogeneity 
may be on the rise, with the increasing importance of services that are 
“knowledge  based”  or  “information  based.”  These closely  related 
categories include services that provide access to proprietary  infor- 
mation (from mailing lists to industrial patents and trade secrets) and 
the services of  individuals with specialized knowledge (from nursing 
to law). In practice, the two categories overlap; for example, an in- 
creasing range of services can be provided directly to the customer by 
skilled individuals or offered indirectly in the form of proprietary com- 
puter software packages. 
Fundamentally, service activities may be distinguished either by the 
nature of their products or by  the way in  which those products are 
supplied.  lo Most service industries produce outputs that are intangible 
and nonstorable, although the rapidly growing category of information- 
based services offers important exceptions. For sectors such as tele- 
communications and computers, services and tangible goods are often 
provided together as part of a single transaction. Another character- 
izing feature of service products is high value-added relative to gross 
output. Again, however, there is a major exception, wholesale and retail 
trade, if  the value of goods sold is included as an input. 
Looking at the production process, services often require physical 
proximity of the producer and the consumer, a distinction that is par- 
ticularly  relevant for international competition in these  sectors, al- 
though new communication technologies are changing the importance 
of this production constraint. For some knowledge-based services, a 
salient characteristic is strong economies of scale in production. Scale 
economies may reflect large fixed costs of  physical equipment, as in 
telecommunications; large fixed costs of research and development, as 
for patented  industrial  knowledge;  or large fixed costs of  acquiring 
managerial or technical  expertise which can then be extended inex- 
pensively to additional customers, as in  management consulting.  Es- 
pecially in financial service activities, scale offers the further cost ad- 
vantage of internal risk diversification. 377  International Competition in Services 
6.3.2  International Competition in Services 
In general, international trade may be regarded as the indirect  ex- 
change of productive inputs embodied in the goods traded, that is, as 
a substitute for the direct movement of inputs across national bound- 
aries.” Opportunities for and gains from international trade in services 
thus depend on the extent to which this indirect exchange is feasible. 
Since services are distinguished from tangible goods in part by greater 
constraints on the physical location of  producer and consumer, it is 
helpful to classify services with respect to such constraints. There are 
four possible cases.  l2 
1.  No required13 movement of providers or demanders. These have 
been called “separated” services (Sampson and Snape 1985) and “dis- 
embodied” or “long-distance” services (Bhagwati 1984). Such services 
are fundamentally similar to tangible goods with respect to opportu- 
nities for trade and gains from trade. 
2.  Required movement  of  providers  (demander-located services). 
Where physical proximity to the market is essential, international com- 
petition  necessarily entails movement of  capital or labor to the pro- 
duction site, as in construction. However, the production process may 
also involve some inputs in another location  (e.g., research  and de- 
velopment or management). Deardorff (1985) calls these additional in- 
puts “absent factors.” 
3. Required  movement  of  demanders  (provider-located  services). 
The obvious example is tourism, but in practice, health and education 
are also important categories. Free “trade”  in such services requires 
unrestricted international movement of potential demanders. 
4. Required movement of either providers or demanders. In this case, 
production requires proximity, but the activity is ‘‘footloose’’ and can 
occur in the importing nation, the exporting nation, or even in a third 
location. 
Another relevant classification of  services is with respect to their 
relationship to merchandise trade. Some internationally provided ser- 
vices are complementary to trade in tangible goods (e.g., transporta- 
tion, insurance, computer software), some offer alternatives to goods 
trade (e.g., licensing, computing services), while a third group is un- 
related to goods trade (e.g., health and education). 
Both classification schemes can be useful in sorting out issues of 
international competition (and barriers to international competition) in 
the broad range of  activities usually lumped together in the category 
of services. However, any such taxonomy is necessarily arbitrary, and 
rapid changes in technology may in any case shift a particular activity 
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U.S. firms may offer their services (and also tangible products) for 
sale abroad through direct exports or through local domestic trans- 
actions of a foreign affiliate.14  In standard usage, a U.S. service “ex- 
port” entails production by U.S.  residents of a service purchased by 
a resident of another nation. It is thus the country of residence of the 
producer and buyer, rather than  the  site of  production,  that distin- 
guishes trade in services. While the same definition applies for tangible 
goods, most trade in goods is accomplished by the movement of the 
goods themselves across national boundaries. But except for separated 
services (case  1 above), trade in  services involves the movement of 
the producer and/or the buyer of the service. 
As an alternative to exporting, a U.S. firm may establish a foreign 
subsidiary or enter into a joint venture with a foreign firm. In this case, 
the affiliate abroad can provide the service. Most of the affiliate’s labor 
requirements will  be  met  locally, although  some skilled workers  or 
managers may also move for a time period from the United States to 
the site of  the foreign affiliate. In both trade and affiliate sales, there 
is a link to the U.S. firm, but sales abroad of U.S. affiliates do not 
necessarily entail a specific transaction between a U.S. resident and a 
resident of another nation and thus may not enter directly into the U.S. 
balance of payments accounts. 
However, exporting and affiliate sales are not  mutually exclusive 
modes of participation in foreign markets. In fact, they are often com- 
plementary activities of multinational corporations (see Bergsten, Horst, 
and Moran 1978, chap. 3). Likewise, trade and factor movements, or 
exports of goods and exports of services, have significant complemen- 
tarity in actual transactions. The potential links among alternative modes 
of competition in foreign markets are highlighted in the following com- 
parison, adapted from Feketekuty and Krause (1986), of  the foreign 
sale of  an automobile  (tangible good) and of  insurance (service).  In 
both instances, movement abroad of  U.S. factors, establishment of a 
foreign affiliate, and exporting are all potentially present. 
To sell automobiles abroad, the U.S. producer usually establishes a 
dealer network in the foreign market. The U.S.  firm need not own the 
dealerships, but in practice often does so. The firm also sends sales 
representatives to the foreign market to negotiate the terms under which 
the cars will be sold, government relations representatives to persuade 
foreign governments that safety and environmental standards have been 
met, and engineers to train and advise local mechanics. The automo- 
biles themselves may be exported from the United States or produced 
by a local subsidiary. Often, market penetration begins with exporting 
and may be followed by establishment of a local subsidiary. Even then, 
the local operation may simply assemble automobiles from parts im- 
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The U.S. insurance company wishing to sell policies abroad will 
likewise require a dealer network of local insurance brokers or agents 
to sell and service the policies. Again, the U.S.  company need not own 
the brokerages but may do so. The U.S. insurance company will like- 
wise need to send government relations managers to satisfy the foreign 
government that local regulatory  requirements have been met, sales 
representatives to deal with local brokers, and perhaps management 
consultants to help train the local brokers. 
For both automobiles and insurance, what is “exported”  concep- 
tually to the foreign market represents just a fraction of the value of 
the purchase made by the final consumer. Value added by local inputs, 
including sales and service personnel and transportation, makes up the 
difference. In the  case of  insurance,  what is exported by  the U.S. 
company is mainly risk bearing and related industry know-how, as well 
as other “headquarter services” of  the parent corporation. 
Attempting to classify any given transaction as either an export or 
an affiliate sale may thus produce a distorted overall picture of inter- 
national competition. A more appropriate question concerns the rela- 
tive importance of the two modes of foreign competition. The extent 
to which a given foreign transaction is carried out through affiliate sales 
rather  than  exporting obviously  depends on technology  but  is also 
influenced by a variety of government policies toward transborder flows 
of products and data, movements of  people, and direct foreign invest- 
ment. Such policies at home and abroad may have a minor influence 
on the global market share of a given firm but a major influence on the 
firm’s primary mode of participation in foreign markets. 
6.3.3  Comparative Advantage in Services 
Comparative advantage is the basic determinant of the direction of 
trade and of  the gains from trade among nations: nations export the 
goods they can produce relatively cheaply and import goods that are 
relatively more costly to produce at home. Trade can thus be viewed 
as a superior indirect technology for producing certain goods. A given 
supply of  primary inputs yields a greater total value of outputs when 
resources are concentrated in activities that are relatively more efficient. 
Conceptually, comparative advantage may rest on differences in rel- 
ative factor abundance, differences in technology, or the existence of 
scale economies. Most of the literature on merchandise trade has fo- 
cused on the role of  relative factor abundance. When countries have 
similar tastes and technologies, each will tend to export goods making 
relatively intensive use of its abundant factors and import goods re- 
quiring large amounts of its scarce factors.l5 
Accordingly, U.S. comparative  advantage  should  lie  in  the high- 
technology areas, as these employ large amounts of skilled labor, the 380  Rachel McCullochlMaurice R. GreenbergILionel  H. Olmer 
nation’s abundant resource. Extending the same approach to services, 
there is a similar presumption that U.S. comparative advantage will lie 
in  the high-technology end of  the spectrum, and particularly in  the 
production and export of knowledge itself. 
However, recent theoretical research has emphasized the potential 
role of  economies of  scale in  determining trade flows and the gains 
from trade. With restricted trade, large countries will tend to have lower 
prices for goods and services subject to important economies of scale.16 
But these lower prices do not necessarily predict the direction of trade 
when barriers are removed; with integrated markets, a firm located in 
a small nation no longer operates at a cost disadvantage. 
Moreover, while scale economies increase the potential benefits from 
liberalization, they also complicate the issue of how these benefits are 
shared. In particular, the possibility that a given nation may lose by 
expanding  trade  even though  global efficiency is improved  is more 
difficult to rule out when scale economies are important. Mutual gains 
are assured only if  each country is able, on average, to expand pro- 
duction in industries with scale economies. ’’ 
Information-based  and knowledge-based  services are the areas in 
which U.S. firms and U.S. policymakers  seem most confident of  ex- 
panding global sales. These services are likely to exhibit strong econ- 
omies of scale. The theoretical analysis of comparative advantage and 
gains from trade  suggests both that the apparent U.S. advantage in 
these industries (as measured by domestic prices) may be overstated 
under current conditions and that the cautious approach of other na- 
tions toward the liberalization of trade in services may have a firm 
economic basis. 
6.4  Services in the Domestic Economy 
This section reviews evidence on the growing importance of services 
in U.S. employment and production, and compares U.S. trends with 
experience of  other nations. Tables 6.3-6.8  indicate the division of 
U.S. economic activity into service and nonservice components ac- 
cording to two alternative criteria. As discussed below, the most im- 
portant categories of internationally traded services (see tables 6.1 and 
6.2) are not the same ones that are most important in terms of  recent 
growth of domestic employment. 
6.4.1  Services in U.S. Employment 
Sectoral employment is the yardstick that demonstrates most clearly 
the extent to which the United States has become a “postindustrial” 
or service economy. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show recent  nonagricultural 
employment of  U.S. workers by type of  industry. The service-producing 381  International Competition in Services 
Table 6.3  U.S.  Employment on Nonagricultural Payrolls by Industry, 
1984-86  (thousands) 
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Source: Monthly Labor Review,  October 1986, table 13. 
Note: Data for 1984 and 1985 are annual averages;  1986 data are for May. 
sectors are distinguished here by the intangible nature of their output 
and include both final-demand and intermediate-input categories. 
As table 6.3 shows, U.S. employment is now heavily concentrated 
in the industries broadly described as service producing: transporta- 
tion, public utilities, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance, real 
estate, miscellaneous business services, health, and government. This 
broad range of activities comprises all industries that are not included 
in  the goods-producing  sector, that  is, manufacturing, construction, 
mining, and agriculture. The employment classification in table 6.3 is 
made on the basis of  the industry’s main output, which may be sold 
to final consumers (health, education), used as an intermediate input 
(business services), or both (restaurants). 382  Rachel McCullochlMaurice R. Greenberg/Lionel H. OImer 
Table 6.4  U.S. Employment on Nonagricnltural Payrolls by Industry, 














1919  1930  1940  1950  1960  1970  1980  1983 
27.1  29.4  32.4  45.2  54.1  70.9  90.4  90.1 
24.4  26.3  28.2  39.2  45.8  58.3  74.2  74.3 
12.8  12.0  13.2  18.5  20.4  23.6  25.7  23.4 
1.1  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.6  1.0  1.0 
1.0  1.4  1.4  2.4  3.0  3.6  4.3  3.9 
10.7  9.6  11.0  15.2  16.8  19.4  20.3  18.5 
14.3  17.5  19.1  26.7  33.8  47.3  64.7  66.7 
3.7  3.7  3.0  4.0  4.0  4.5  5.1  4.9 
n.a.  n.a.  1.8  2.6  3.1  4.0  5.3  5.3 
n.a.  n.a.  4.9  6.8  8.2  11.0  15.0  15.5 
1.1  1.5  1.5  1.9  2.6  3.6  5.2  5.5 
and real estate 
Services  2.3  3.4  3.7  5.4  7.4  11.5  17.9  19.7 
Government  2.7  3.1  4.2  6.0  8.4  12.6  16.2  15.9 
Federal  n.a.  0.5  1.0  1.9  2.3  2.7  2.9  2.8 
State  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.5  2.7  3.6  3.7 
Local  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  4.5  7.2  9.8  9.4 
Source: U.S. Department of  Labor 1985, table 63. 
Note:  Data include Alaska and Hawaii beginning in  1960. Details may not sum to totals 
due to rounding. 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 indicate the nation’s  labor force  allocation  in 
longer-term perspective. Table 6.5 shows the division of U.S.  employ- 
ment among three major sectors: agriculture, goods, and services. Here 
agriculture includes forestry and fisheries ; goods-producing employ- 
ment includes mining and construction.  Government employment  is 
allocated according to industry, with only public administration listed 
as a separate service category. 
Table 6.5 reveals that the growth of service-sector employment as a 
share of the U.S. labor force is a trend going back to 1850, the earliest 
year  for which data are available.  However, until recent  years that 
growth was accommodated mainly through the secular contraction of 
agriculture’s share. Agriculture accounted for about two-thirds of U.S. 
employment in 1850 but less than 4 percent by the 1980s. 
In contrast,  the  share of  goods-producing  employment increased 
steadily until the turn of the century and moved cyclically around the 
one-third mark for many years thereafter. Only in the past twenty years 
has growth of employment in service-producing industries come mainly 
at the expense of manufacturing and the other nonagricultural goods- 
producing sectors. 
Even so, it is primarily the share of the goods-producing sectors in 
total employment, rather than the level of such employment, that has 383  International Competition in Services 
Table 6.5  U.S. Employment by  Major Sector, 1850-1982  (percentage 
of total) 
Goods  Service 
Year  Agriculture  Producing  Producing 
1850  64.5  17.7  17.8 
1860  59.9  20.1  20.0 
1870  50.8  25.0  24.2 
1890  43.1  28.3  28.6 
1900  38.0  30.5  31.4 
1910  32.1  32.1  35.9 
1920  27.6  34.6  37.7 
1930  21.8  31.7  46.6 
1940  18.3  33.1  48.6 
1952  11.3  35.5  53.3 
1957  9.8  34.3  56.0 
1962  7.8  33.1  59.1 
1967  5.3  34.7  60.1 
1972  4.4  31.4  64.2 
1977  3.7  29.7  66.6 
1979  3.6  30.2  66.3 
1982  3.6  27.2  69.2 
~~  ~~ 
Source: Urquhart 1984, table 1. 
fallen in recent years. As table 6.6 indicates, the number of workers 
in goods-producing employment actually rose between 1967 and 1979, 
even though the share of these sectors fell from 34.7 percent to 30.2 
percent  of  the U.S.  labor force. But  a  sharp recession in  1980-82 
produced a substantial fall in goods-producing employment. Although 
employment  growth resumed  in  1983, by  1986 the total  number of 
workers in the goods-producing industries was still well below previous 
peaks.  Of  course,  employment  in  manufacturing  and  other goods- 
producing sectors fell even more relative to the levels that would have 
been attained had the distribution of the larger labor force among the 
major sectors remained unchanged from the 1967 pattern. 
6.4.2  Services in Gross National Product 
A similar pattern emerges from an examination of U.S. gross national 
product (GNP) by industry, as shown in table 6.7. In current dollars, 
the service-producing sectors now account for over two-thirds of U.S. 
GNP, up from about 55 percent immediately after World War 11. The 
industrial classifications used in tables 6.3-6.7  include both interme- 
diate and final products, and both government and private activities. 
An alternative measure of  the economic importance of services is 
their share in final demand  as measured by consumer spending. As 
shown in table 6.8, expenditure for services now accounts for about 384  Rachel McCulloch/Maurice K.  Greenberg/Lionel  H. Olmer 
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-  - 
5.2  -  1.7 
34.3  -4.5 
27.5  -  5.0 
59.4  +  6.2 
6.5  +0.0 
18.5  + 1.6 
3.4  +0.5 
15.1  + 1.2 
3.0  + 1.2 
4.7  + 1.2 
24.1  +3.7 
2.7  + 1.0 
5.9  +  2.0 
0.9  +0.2 
14.6  +4.6 
5.1  + 1.9 
6.9  + 1.1 
0.5  +  0.2 
1 .0  +0.6 
5.6  -0.4 
1 .0  -  0.3 
2.0  -  0.4 
0.8  +0.1 
1.8  +0.1 
Source: Urquhart 1984, table 2. 
Note:  Details may not add to totals due to rounding. 
one-half of total personal consumption expenditures, up from about 40 
percent in  1929 and as little as one-third in 1950. The main categories 
of  service expenditures in final demand are housing, utilities and other 
services used in household operation, transportation, and medical care. 
However,  these  data tend  to understate  the  relative  importance  of 
services in  final  consumption,  since they  do not  include  important 
government-financed  consumption  services  such  as  education  and 
recreation. Table 6.7  U.S. Gross National Produet by  Industry, 1947-85  (billions of dollars) 
~~  ~ 
1947  1950  1960  1965  1970  I975  I980  1985 
Total GNP  235.2  288.3  515.3  705.1  1015.5  1598.4  2732.0  3998. I 
Goods producing  102.9  127.3  203.2  271.3  352.3  531.4  903.2  1192.3 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries  20.8  20.8  21.7  24.2  29.9  56.3  77.2  91.5 
Mining  6.8  9.3  12.8  14.0  18.7  41.3  107.3  122.8 
Construction  9.1  13.2  24.3  34.7  51.4  76.5  137.7  182.2 
Manufacturing  66.2  84.0  144.4  198.4  252.3  357.3  581.0  795.8 
Service producing  129.4  158.7  311.4  429.3  657.1  1047.0  1776.3  2770.3 
Wholesale and retail trade  44.2  51.5  85.7  115.0  168.7  273.7  438.8  652.5 
Financial, insurance, and real estate  23.8  32.2  72.8  98.9  145.8  221.7  400.6  626.6 
Services  20.2  24.2  51.4  74.6  120.2  199.8  374.0  639.4 
Transp. and public utilities  21.0  26.6  47.3  62.6  88.4  141.7  240.8  374.4 
Government and government enterprises  20.2  24.2  54.2  78.2  134.0  210.1  322.1  477.4 
Statistical discrepancy  I .8  0.8  -  2.8  -  1.2  -1.1  2.5  4.9  -  5.5 
Rest of the world  1.2  1.5  3.5  5.8  7.3  17.5  47.6  41.2 
Source: Economic Report of  the President,  1987, table B-10. 
Notes:  Industry classification is on an establishment basis and is based on the 1972 Standard Industry Classification. Details may not add to totals 
due to rounding. 386  Rachel McCulloch/Maurice R. Greenberg/Lionel H. Olmer 
Table 6.8  U.S. Personal Consumption Expenditures, 1929-86  (billions 
of  dollars) 
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4.0  4.0  9.5 
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2.2  2.2  6.9 














































~~~  ~  ~~~~~  ~~~~ 
Source: Economic Report of the President, 1987, table 8-14. 
Notes: Housing includes imputed value of owner-occupied housing.  Data for 1986 are 
preliminary. 
6.4.3  Why and How Services Grew 
The summary tables presented in  the previous  sections document 
the evolution of today’s “service economy” but give little insight into 
the causes of these dramatic changes. In brief, the employment and 
output shifts reflect the combined impact of three basic forces: changes 
in  the sectoral allocation of final demand (in turn reflecting rising per 
capita income  and  systematic changes in  relative  prices as well  as 
demographic  shifts), relative rates of productivity  improvement, and 
changes in the organization of economic activity. 
Looking first at the long-term shift of employment out of agriculture 
offers some perspective on the more recent movements from goods- 
producing to service-producing employment. In the case of agriculture, 
low income and price elasticities of demand, changing dietary prefer- 
ences, and sustained high rates of productivity improvement have all 
contributed to agriculture’s declining share of  total employment, even 
over the periods when the United States was increasing its penetration 
of foreign markets. 
Changes in the organization of economic activity reinforced the ef- 
fects of demand and productivity changes, with specialized processing, 
transportation, distribution, and business-services units gradually tak- 
ing over many functions once handled by workers classified as agri- 
cultural employees. But the nation is by no means losing its “agricul- 
tural base” in terms of production. On the contrary, agricultural outputs 
have  continued to grow  with  dismaying rapidity  despite the steady 
decline in the number of workers employed in the sector. 
While the shift from goods-producing to service-producing employ- 
ment is more complex, some of  the same forces were important. Changes 
in the age composition of the population and in the labor force partic- 387  International Competition in Services 
ipation of women have fueled increases in the demand for some services 
that have experienced high rates of growth. These include health and 
education among professional services, and eating and drinking estab- 
lishments, a major component of retail trade.  Moreover, the goods- 
producing sectors have maintained relatively high rates of productivity 
increase, so that outputs of most sectors have continued to rise even 
when  employment  has  stabilized or dipped. Finally, changes in the 
degree of  vertical integration of goods-producing firms have led to a 
reclassification of many workers from other industrial categories as 
service employees, although the work performed by these employees 
is basically unchanged. 
In recent years, “business services” has been the most rapidly grow- 
ing sector of the U.S. economy in terms of employment. The business 
services sector comprises seven major ind~stries:’~  advertising; con- 
sumer credit reporting and collection; mailing, reproduction, and sten- 
ographic  services; services to buildings, including cleaning, mainte- 
nance, and exterminating services; personnel supply services, including 
both temporary-help suppliers and employment agencies ;  computer and 
data processing services; and miscellaneous business services, which 
include research and development, management and consulting, and 
protective services. 
Firms in this industry provide a variety of business services on an 
ongoing contractual  basis  (e.g., janitorial  services, data processing, 
advertising) or to accommodate temporary or cyclical requirements 
(e.g., office personnel, unskilled labor). While some of the included 
activities are new (computer services), the growth of  others reflects 
changes in the way U.S. firms are doing business and particularly in 
employer-employee relationships in the goods-producing sectors of the 
economy.20 
6.4.4  Services, Labor Supply, and Productivity 
Changes in the composition of the labor force may affect growth of 
service employment through changes in productivity as well as through 
changes in the pattern of final demand. The recent bulge of new entrants 
into the labor force was absorbed in large part through expansion of 
employment in the services sector, with slow or negative increases in 
compensation. One recent study found that women hired in the service 
sector were much more likely not to have worked at all in the previous 
year than to have worked previously in the goods sector.21  The rapidly 
growing retail trade sector (which includes the infamous fast-food out- 
lets) experienced the largest relative decline in average hourly earnings 
between  1977 and  1983 of  any major employment sector (U.S. De- 
partment of  Labor 1985, table 78). 388  Rachel McCulloch/Maurice R. Greenberg/Lionel H. Olmer 
With fewer new entrants to the labor force, or with greater downward 
rigidity of wages and employee benefits (as in the European commu- 
nity), a smaller number of  new jobs would have been created in ser- 
vices, while the higher cost of employing additional workers would 
have induced  employers to adopt more  capital-intensive  (i.e., more 
“productive”)  technologies.22 
The relatively strong productivity performance and accordingly low 
employment growth of the goods-producing sectors may have a similar 
explanation. With more extensive unionization and less flexibility in 
compensation and work rules, faster adaptation of  new labor-saving 
technologies would typically mean slower employment growth but higher 
measured increases in labor productivity for any given growth rate of 
output. Thus, for both tangible goods and for services, sectoral patterns 
of labor productivity growth are appropriately viewed as endogenous, 
reflecting the interaction of such forces as technological advance, labor 
market developments, and tax policy. 
6.4.5  International Comparisons 
The relative importance of the U.S. service sector in  total employ- 
ment has increased over time with the nation’s rising per capita income. 
Cross-country  evidence also points  to a  strong positive  correlation 
between service employment and per capita GNP. As table 6.9 shows, 
in  1980 service employment absorbed just 15 percent of the labor force 
of  the world’s poorest  countries, while agriculture  occupied  nearly 
three workers of every four-a  pattern not too different from the United 
States in the mid-1800~~~ 
Among the industrialized nations, the average share of service em- 
ployment was 58 percent, with the United States eight percentage points 
higher. Moreover, between 1965 and 1980, every industrialized country 
showed an increase in the share of services in total employment. The 
same was true also for the nonmarket economies of Eastern Europe 
and for almost all other nations, whether rich or poor. In most cases, 
the increase in the share of services has come at the expense of agri- 
cultural employment, presumably reflecting the dissemination world- 
wide of modern agricultural technologies as well as the industrialization 
goals of many nations.24 
A similar pattern emerges for the percentage share of  services in 
gross domestic product (GDP). As table 6.10 indicates, the percentage 
share of  services in GDP averaged 62 percent in  1984 for the indus- 
trialized nations but only 29 percent for the world’s poorest nations. 
The table also shows that the share of  services has been increasing 
over time for every industrialized nation, while that of industry broadly 
and of manufacturing specifically has been declining. 389  International Competition in Services 
These shares are calculated on the basis of local domestic prices. 
However, prices  of  services tend  to be  higher  relative  to those of 
tangible goods in countries with higher per capita GNP. When a com- 
mon set of international prices is used to value outputs, the percentage 
shares of services in GDP differ less markedly over time for a given 
country or between rich and poor nations in a given year. Using real- 
quantity indexes in place of value shares, Kravis, Heston, and Summers 
(1983)  show  that  in  real  terms, low-income countries  may  actually 
consume services in higher proportions than wealthier nations. This 
finding presumably reflects the very low relative prices of  services in 
poor countries. 
6.5  International Service Transactions 
The high  priority  placed  by  the United  States on negotiations  on 
trade in services is frequently justified by assertions that this trade is 
currently or potentially  very important to the nation’s overall inter- 
national position. Yet the data on U.S. trade in services provide only 
weak support for such a claim. Globally and also for the United States, 
the aggregate size of services trade as reflected in balance of payments 
data is roughly one-fourth that of  merchandise trade. Moreover, that 
Table 6.9  Distribution of Labor Force by Industry,  1965 and 1980 
(percentage of total labor force) 
Country Group 
Agriculture  Industry  Services 













United  Kingdom 
United States 
economies 
Eastern European nonmarket 
77  73  9  13  14  15 
57  44  17  22  26  34 
61  49  14  19  24  32 
53  40  19  23  28  36 









7  38  35  48  58 
5  33  29  57  65 
9  39  35  43  56 
6  48  44  42  50 
12  42  41  34  48 
11  32  34  42  55 
3  47  38  50  59 
4  35  31  60  66 
35  21  34  40  31  39 
Source: World Development Report, 1986, table 30. 
Notes:  Country groups are as defined by the World Bank. Group averages are weighted 
by population. Table 6.10  Structure of Production by Major Sector, 1965 and 1984 (percentage of  total gross 
domestic product) 
Country Group 
Agriculture  Industry  Manufacturing  Services 
1965  1984  1965  1984  1%5  1984  1965  1984 
Low-income economies  43 
Middle-income economies  21 
Oil exporters  22 
Oil importers  21 
High-income oil exporters  5 
Industrialized market economies  5 
Canada  5 
France  - 
Germany  - 






































































28  29 
47  49 
50  46 
46  52 
30  31 
56  62 
71  72 
-  62 
-  52 
48  55 
48  56 
56  62 
59  66 
Source: World Development Report, 1986, table 3. 
Notes: Country groups are as defined by the World Bank. Group averages are weighted by population. Japanese 
data are for 1965 and 1983. 391  International Competition in Services 
proportion has been relatively stable in recent years. Thus, neither the 
absolute size nor the rate of growth of trade transactions in services 
by themselves makes a compelling case for its recent promotion to a 
top position on the trade policy agenda of the United States. 
Although there  is ample reason  to believe  that official trade data 
seriously underestimate the true value of both U.S.  service exports 
and imports, even improved and expanded services data do not provide 
credible support for a major push on services trade. If there is a strong 
argument for broad-based negotiations on services, it appears to apply 
less to trade than to the alternative mode of international competition, 
sales abroad of  U.S. affiliates. 
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 show the value and composition of international 
service exports in  1980 for the twenty-five leading service-exporting 
nations. The United States is indeed largest in terms of  services ex- 
ports, as well as merchandise  exports and income from foreign in- 
vestment. However, the relative importance of  services; as measured 
by the ratio of  service exports to GDP, is less for the United  States 
than for most of  the other nations. This should perhaps not be sur- 
prising, given the very large absolute size of the U.S. market. But the 
ratio of service exports to merchandise exports is also far below that 
of other major service exporters. 
Still, these data provide only a partial indication of  the importance 
of  international competition in services to the U.S. economy. As de- 
scribed in section 6.3, a U.S. firm may compete in markets abroad 
through direct exports or through a foreign affiliate. A service export 
entails production by  U.S. residents  of a service purchased  by  the 
resident  of  another nation.  At  least in  principle,  the total value  of 
service export sales appears in the services section of the U.S. balance 
of payments accounts.25  As shown in table 6.12, the most important 
service export categories by value for the United States and most other 
nations are travel and transportation. 
Unlike  export  sales,  sales abroad of  U.S. affiliates do not enter 
directly  into the U.S. international accounts, as such  sales do not 
necessarily entail a specific transaction between a U.S. resident and a 
resident of  another nation. Affiliate sales probably have important in- 
direct effects on two items in the services section of  balance of pay- 
ments accounts-earnings of  U.S. investments abroad and intrafirm 
payments of royalties and licensing fees. But neither item provides a 
reliable measure of the U.S. stake in the foreign market, because pay- 
ments between the parent and foreign affiliates are shaped by tax con- 
siderations and other dimensions of  national regulation. 
For the firms and industries that have shown the greatest interest in 
a U.S. initiative on services trade, sales abroad by foreign affiliates are 
substantially larger than exports from U.S. operations, although the 392  Rachel McCulloch/Maurice R. Greenberg/Lionel H. Olmer 
Table 6.11  Twenty-five Largest Services Exporters in 1980 (billions of U.S. 
dollars) 
Services 
Value of  Services  Exports to 
Value of  Foreign  Value of  Exports to  Merchandise 
Services  Investment  Merchandise  GDP Ratio  Exports Ratio 


























34.9  70.2 
34.2  17.1 
33.0  18.4 
22.4  8.5 
22.4  5.3 
18.9  7.2 
17.7  10.0 
14.5  17.6 
11.7  0.2 
10.8  2.5 
8.4  n.a. 
7.5  0.8 
7.4  1  .o 
7.3  0.5 
7.0  2.9 
5.9  n.a. 
4.5  0.3 
4.5  0.2 
4.0  0.0 
3.7  n.a. 
3.5  0.7 
3.2  0.7 
3.0  0.4 
2.8  0.2 












































































Source: U.S. Trade Representative 1983, table 2. 
Notes:  Values  converted to U.S.  dollars at current exchange rates. Services exports 
exclude official transactions and investment earnings. Foreign investment earnings in- 
clude private direct investment income and portfolio income but exclude foreign official 
income. 
industries’ own discussions  typically do not distinguish these two types 
of  foreign  operations or divide revenues from foreign markets into 
exports and affiliate transactions. 
The importance of  subsidiary  sales in  total  foreign  sales of  U.S. 
service firms is qualitatively similar to the situation  of international 
competition in tangible goods.  In the manufacturing industries, U.S. 
firms have maintained a roughly constant share of  world exports in 
recent decades. But exports from the United States have constituted 
a  declining  share of  total  U.S. sales in  international  markets, with 
exports from U.S. affiliates abroad increasing to maintain overall con- 
stancy of the total market share (Lipsey and Kravis 1985). 393  International Competition in Services 
Table 6.U  Major Categories of  Service Exports, 1980 (billions of 
U.S. dollars) 
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37.5  4.0 
37.1  5.8 
33.0  1.3 
33.8  5.3 
23.5  3.3 
19.4  7.4 
18.6  3.7 
14.9  2.4 
12.2  1.2 
10.8  0.7 
8.4  0.4 
8.0  1.8 
7.7  n.a. 
9.2  5.0 
7.0  0.8 
5.9  0.6 
4.8  1  .o 
4.6  0.4 
4.0  0.1 
4.3  n.a. 
3.5  0.5 
3.1  0.6 
3.2  0.3 
3.0  0.5 
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Source: U.S. Trade Representative 1983, table 3. 
Notes: Values converted to U.S. dollars at current exchange rates. Other private services 
include IMF  balance of payments categories “other goods, services and income,”  “labor 
income, n.i.e.,”  and “property income, n.i.e.”  Totals on this table may not match data 
in table 6.11 because of  intervening revisions in the IMF data tapes used. 
In the case of services, available data are sketchy for both exports 
and foreign sales. One estimate suggests that revenues from sales abroad 
of U.S. affiliates exceed those from U.S. exports on average by about 
50 percent (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1986). 
Since profit rates of foreign subsidiaries are usually higher than those 
of domestic operations, this would mean that, in terms of  profits to 
U.  S.  firms competing internationally, affiliate sales probably account 
for well over half of all profits generated by operations abroad. How- 
ever, affiliate sales translate into a smaller demand for domestic labor 
input than the same dollar volume of export sales. 
The importance of affiliate sales relative to direct exporting varies 
substantially across those industries with important international trans- 394  Rachel McCulloch/Maurice R. Greenberg/Lionel H. Olmer 
actions.  For  some major service industries, including travel, educa- 
tional and legal services, and technology licensing, direct exports ac- 
count for nearly all revenues from international transactions. In a second 
group, including insurance, advertising, and accounting, affiliate sales 
provide the bulk of foreign revenues. For a third group, including trans- 
portation, construction, consulting, and computer software, both direct 
exports and affiliate sales are significant. Table 6.13 shows Office of 
Technology Assessment estimates of  1983 revenues in both categories 
for U.S.  service firms. Banking, an important  service industry both 
domestically and in international transactions, was treated separately 
because of the special problem of distinguishing investment income 
from the service component of foreign revenues. 
Given that affiliate sales greatly exceed exports for many service 
providers, a broader measure of the importance of international trans- 
actions to U.S.  service industries is the size of total foreign revenues 
Table 6.13  OTA  Estimates of Foreign Revenues of U.S. Service Fms,  1983 
(billions of dollars) 
Total 
Direct  Affiliate  Foreign 
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Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1986, table 5. 395  International Competition in Services 
from both sources relative to overall sales. For the major U.S. service 
industries as ranked on the basis of  domestic employment, including 
health services and education, foreign revenues from exporting plus 
affiliate sales are small relative to the value of total output. Moreover, 
as with merchandise trade, a few large firms account for the lion’s share 
of all U.S. international service transactions in a given industry. 
While there is no “typical”  service sector, the insurance industry 
can provide  an illustration of the relative  magnitudes.  According to 
Stalson (1985, 94), there are about ten thousand insurance companies 
worldwide, with half of  those in  the United States alone. But only a 
few hundred have significant foreign sales. Of  this group, about fifty 
are U.S. firms; among the U.S. firms, five are very large and operate 
in many countries. Revenues from foreign sales constitute about one- 
tenth of total revenues for the U.S. industry, with most of that going 
to five firms. 
Although the data for many service industries are seriously deficient, 
a more significant problem is in interpretation. None of the available 
measures can give an accurate indication of the contribution of foreign 
sales to profits.  For  information-based  service industries,  including 
telecommunications  and most business services, fixed costs may ac- 
count for a very large portion of  total costs. Expansion into foreign 
markets (whether through exports or sales of  affiliates abroad) may 
thus make a contribution to profits far in excess of the proportion of 
foreign sales to total  revenues.26 Of  course, the actual or potential 
contribution to profits of U.S.  firms is still far from a measure of the 
national stake in pursuing multilateral liberalization of  barriers to in- 
ternational competition in the service sector. This is particularly rel- 
evant at a time when  attaining  U.S. goals will  surely require trade 
concessions affecting the prospects of other domestic industries. 
6.6  Barriers to International Competition 
The U.S. move to promote inclusion of  services in the new round 
of  GATT negotiations  reflects  the belief  not  only that international 
service transactions are important to the American economy but also 
that  significant barriers  hamper the access of  U.S.  firms to foreign 
markets.  This section considers the types of  barriers that might be 
included in efforts to maintain open markets for services transactions, 
and prospects for success based on experience in negotiating limits on 
barriers to merchandise trade. 
6.6.1  Barriers to Merchandise Transactions 
Even for the relatively straightforward case of  tangible goods, bar- 
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barrier, have not entirely disappeared, and high tariffs are still present 
for some products.  However, in recent decades focus has shifted to 
nontariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, meaning all other national policies 
that potentially affect the volume of and gains from international trade. 
The Kennedy round of GATT negotiations succeeded in slicing most 
tariff rates to postwar lows. The subsequent Tokyo round was the first 
to tackle the much broader issue of nontariff barriers, but with only 
modest results. 
At least four major reasons account for the  slow progress.  First, 
NTBs are not one problem but fifty or three hundred separate problems, 
ranging from relatively straightforward quantitative trade restrictions 
to such complex mechanisms as product standards, government pro- 
curement procedures,  and labor market policies.  In most cases, the 
impact on foreign competition  is  not  the primary  motivation  of  the 
policy, although in practice such policies are nonetheless administered 
in a way that puts foreign firms at a disadvantage in serving the local 
market. 
A second reason for slow progress in limiting the proliferation  of 
nontariff barriers is that their use arises partly from basic deficiencies 
of the GATT structure in handling problems of adjustment to changing 
international conditions. For example, the widespread use of  “volun- 
tary” export restraints (VERs) reflects general dissatisfaction with the 
provisions of article 19, which in principle governs members’ response 
to unanticipated changes in international competition. 
Third, the GATT was designed under the assumption that national 
policies can be viewed as having both “domestic”  and “international” 
components. The GATT rules focus primarily on the latter-that  is, 
policies applied at the national border. But the increased integration of 
national markets has made this dichotomy almost obsolete. 
Finally  and  perhaps  most  important, both  the GATT negotiation 
process and the GATT rules are predicated on a mercantilistic view of 
the gains from international trade, that is, that the “gains” from open 
markets are expanded exports and that any increased imports represent 
the price paid for the opportunity to expand exports. By  failing to 
emphasize the real mutual gains from integrated global markets, GATT 
member nations  have shifted negotiating efforts in  inappropriate di- 
rections, even to the point of forcing GATT to become a party to global 
cartelization of the markets for textiles and apparel.27 
Unfortunately, the factors that apply to merchandise  trade are at 
least equally relevant for international competition in services, where 
movement of “traded”  products across national borders is the excep- 
tion rather than the rule. This does not necessarily imply that inclusion 
of services in forthcoming negotiations is unprofitable. It does, how- 
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are likely to be exacerbated rather than eased by broadening its man- 
date to include services. 
6.6.2  Barriers to Competition in Services 
Diverse in many respects, the service industries do not share com- 
mon objectives with respect to expansion abroad.  Indeed, some in- 
dustries with well-established foreign operations are hesitant to par- 
ticipate in a generic sectoral push to expand market access abroad lest 
their own firm-specific and industry-specific needs receive less favor- 
able attention from foreign governments. Even information on the rel- 
ative importance of particular types of barriers is not easily collected. 
Some U.S.  firms are reluctant to divulge information that might indicate 
their competitive position to foreign or domestic rivals, and the service 
firms as a group are less accustomed than those in the goods-producing 
sectors to providing detailed information about their business opera- 
tions  to government agencies on a regular basis (U.S. International 
Trade Commission 1982, 1). 
To  provide better support for U.S. efforts, the International Trade 
Commission conducted a voluntary survey of 479 international service 
firms in fourteen service industries. Only about one-fourth of the firms 
responded to the survey, and the response rate was much lower in 
some industries. In communication services, only one firm out of eight 
responded to the questionnaire. 
Respondents identified the degree to which specific nontariff barriers 
were encountered in foreign markets. Most important were restrictions 
affecting the basic “right of establishment”  in the foreign market (63 
percent of all respondents), specific barriers to provision of a service 
by foreign firms (62 percent), and foreign exchange controls (54 per- 
cent). Other barriers in order of frequency included government pro- 
curement (30 percent), technical issues (27 percent), restrictions on 
related trade in goods (21 percent), subsidies and countervailing duties 
(21 percent), licensing requirements (18 percent), standards and cert- 
ification (17 percent), inadequate protection of intellectual property (12 
percent), and professional qualification restrictions (10 percent). 
Despite the ubiquitous  nature of these barriers, one-fourth of  the 
firms did not anticipate any increase in foreign revenues from their 
removal.  Presumably  profits would rise, however.  Half of the firms 
surveyed did expect revenues to increase, but the anticipated increase 
was surprisingly small41  billion in total, plus another $2 billion in 
associated merchandise trade exports.28 
6.6.3  Why Liberalization Is Opposed 
Looking  at specific barriers  and  speculating on the prospects for 
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countries have responded coolly to U.S. proposals for liberalization of 
trade in services. If the experience with merchandise trade is indicative, 
agreeing to eliminate specific barriers without regard to their domestic 
objectives usually means that other policies,  possibly less desirable 
from an efficiency perspective, will be substituted in short order. 
Obviously, all the same kinds of economic and political consider- 
ations-employment, adjustment, regional effects, and so forth-that 
arise with liberalization of merchandise trade are equally relevant for 
trade in services. But some additional domestic considerations appear 
to be more important for services as a group than for goods. 
First, many types of services, from banking and telecommunications 
to haircuts and restaurants, are subject to extensive local regulation, 
either because they are considered essential to national welfare and 
security or because they have important potential effects on consumer 
health and safety. Whatever their motive, regulatory barriers typically 
ensure above-normal profits for successful entrants, making current 
domestic providers particularly reluctant to share the market and po- 
tential foreign providers particularly keen to enter. 
Moreover, local regulation is likely to act as a barrier to international 
competition even when the regulation is applied evenhandedly to both 
domestic and foreign firms; the same requirement is often more difficult 
and costly for a foreign firm to meet because of language barriers or 
general unfamiliarity with local legal and administrative procedures. 
But regulation often discriminates explicitly between domestic firms 
and foreign-controlled suppliers. 
For some particular sectors deemed “essential,”  a foreign presence 
is considered undesirable or even unacceptable. For example, the United 
States prohibits  foreign ownership of  radio and television  stations, 
while Brazil and Japan exclude foreign firms in  some telecommuni- 
cations sectors. Many countries provide essential services via a public 
monopoly. Even the United States maintains a government monopoly 
in postal service. 
For such sectors there are really two different cases for excluding 
foreign firms. In some instances a nation may desire to maintain per- 
manent local control over a particular sector, even if this control comes 
at a cost in terms of efficiency. Presumably a national security motive 
is present in most such cases. For a second group, the need of  “tem- 
porary” protection is justified by a variant of the usual infant industry 
argument. 
The perceived need to protect infant service industries is an impor- 
tant factor underlying the strong resistance of some developing nations 
to GATT negotiations on services. Financial services as well as tele- 
communications  and  associated  information-based  services are fre- 
quently protected, with the goal of nurturing a domestic provider not 
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services are important intermediate inputs, protection raises costs and 
lowers efficiency for all the using industries, thus lowering the odds of 
survival for other, perhaps more promising, infants. 
As  noted  in  section 6.3, however,  it  is theoretically  possible  for 
liberalization to reduce national welfare unless  a country is able on 
average to expand its outputs in activities with scale economies. This 
condition  is unlikely to be met for most developing nations,  so  the 
theoretical case for developing-country liberalization of service sectors 
is not airtight. 
Finally, some countries generally concerned about foreign influence 
within their borders see liberalization of “trade” in services as the start 
of a general assault on national policies restricting direct foreign in- 
vestment. Their alarm has some justification, since U.S. firms pressing 
for expanded markets abroad rarely distinguish between opportunities 
for trade and opportunities for affiliate sales. 
Overall, as in the case of merchandise trade, a variety of arguments 
may be used to justify barriers against foreign competition in service 
sectors. But, as in the case of merchandise trade, the “national inter- 
est”  arguments for continued protection are put forward mainly by 
those  whose  own  commercial  interests  would  be  threatened  by 
liberalization. 
6.7  Where and How to Negotiate on Services 
Although the United  States has succeeded in putting the services 
issue on the agenda for the new GATT round, many questions con- 
cerning future U.S. negotiations in  this area remain to be answered. 
This section considers two. First, what are the merits of pursuing the 
services issue in other bilateral or multilateral forums, in addition to 
or instead of the GATT? Second, what are the alternative strategies 
that might be used to make progress on this admittedly difficult issue? 
6.7.1 
As a practical matter, it is too late to wonder whether the United 
States is prepared to lead international negotiations on service issues 
in the GATT.29  For better or worse, the decision has been made and 
cannot be reversed without substantial loss of credibility for the United 
States. Gaps in knowledge, both analytical and empirical, remain sig- 
nificant but are beginning to be filled. However, the Uruguay round of 
GATT negotiations is expected to extend over a number of years. In 
the meantime, what might be accomplished by pursuing some of  the 
same issues with selected trading partners in other forums? 
Since progress on service issues will require countries to grapple 
with a whole new set of nontariff distortions of international commerce, 
bilateral negotiations offer an opportunity to explore these issues with 
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just one partner. In the case of  Canada, where broader bilateral ne- 
gotiations on a free trade area are already in progress, there is a natural 
opportunity to test out possible negotiating strategies. One special com- 
plication in this case is Canada’s provincial regulatory structure. How- 
ever, given the generally cordial relationship between the United States 
and Canada and the high degree of integration of the two economies, 
any  approach that fails in this test  case can  probably  be  scrapped 
without trying it out in the GATT. 
A second possibility is to work initially within a group of countries 
with a particular interest in pursuing liberalization in the services area. 
This has been termed a  “minilateral”  approach or a  “GATT of  the 
like-minded.” Since the developing nations have expressed the greatest 
reservations about services, such a group would presumably be drawn 
from the OECD, or the OECD might become the formal sponsor of a 
parallel negotiation.30  Agreements reached within the group would have 
a conditional most-favored-nation (MFN) status, applying only to the 
nations agreeing to abide by the terms.31  However, others could join 
the group later by agreeing to the same terms. 
While the benefits of learning by doing in a smaller negotiation are 
real, there are some risks as well. Bilateral or minilateral negotiations 
create preferential trading arrangements that become vested interests. 
This may reduce the motivation of some GATT members to press for 
broader  and more  inclusive agreements later on (Aho and Aronson 
1985). Another danger is that the terms of a bilateral agreement with, 
say, Canada, may be difficult to extend to other trading partners with 
stronger comparative  advantage  in  certain  sectors (e.g.,  transport, 
construction). 
6.7.2  How to Negotiate on Services 
Here the basic choice is whether to organize the discussions along 
sectoral lines (e.g., insurance, telecommunications) or to attempt as in 
the Tokyo round to develop codes that cover particular types of policies 
(e.g., subsidies, government procurement policies) for all or most types 
of  traded services.32  Given the vast universe of policies that impinge 
on international services competition, it is not possible to handle all 
relevant issues through the second approach, so the question is really 
about the degree of emphasis accorded to each. 
One strategy to prevent the task from becoming unmanageable is to 
begin by extending as far as possible the current GATT framework on 
merchandise trade to services transactions. This approach would iden- 
tify any  “easy”  liberalization gains from moving negotiating efforts 
into virgin territory.  At  the same time, information would be gained 
about the important specific issues that do not fall easily into a frame- 
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Another important issue is the extent to which liberalization in ser- 
vice trade is linked to issues on goods.  The two-track compromise 
agreed on at Punta del Este suggests that linkage will be minimal, at 
least at the start. Unfortunately, complete separation places limits on 
the efficiency gains attainable through  multilateral negotiations, and 
especially potential north-south agreements to make liberalization in 
labor-intensive manufactured goods in the north the quid pro quo for 
high-technology and services liberalization in the south. 
One final strategic issue concerns timing. The conventional wisdom 
is that the pressure of deadlines and media attention can help negoti- 
ators to reach mutually beneficial compromises that might otherwise 
prove elusive. With perhaps a decade of slogging through difficult issues 
ahead, there is need for some short-term goals where progress can be 
made, and announced, sooner. 
6.8  Summing Up 
The United States has indeed become a “service  economy ”-and 
so have most U.S. trading partners, both industrialized and developing. 
But although domestic employment at home and abroad is now heavily 
concentrated  in the service industries, tangible goods still dominate 
international trade. Moreover, the  services that absorb most of  the 
labor force at home are not the same services that account for most 
international service transactions or even the ones ripe for global ex- 
pansion in the near future. 
Thus, the need to press forward on liberalization of  services must 
be justified  along other lines-for  example, to maintain the forward 
momentum in multilateral negotiations or to restore domestic support 
in the United  States for open international markets. Yet  these argu- 
ments seem shaky if services are allowed to displace important unfin- 
ished business in the traditional areas of GATT efforts, especially safe- 
guards. Also, if  U.S. service firms are interested mainly in expanding 
sales abroad of their foreign affiliates rather than exports, as the greater 
importance of the former in total revenues suggests, then the resulting 
base for domestic support may be rather narrow. 
There are important positive aspects to bringing services into the 
GATT, however. Despite its sometimes disappointing record, the GATT 
remains the only international organization where rules are taken se- 
rio~sly.3~  Because services would be a new issue in the GATT, there 
could be some easy gains to be made initially; in merchandise trade, 
only the hard things are left to tackle. Consideration of services would 
necessitate greater attention to the links between trade and direct in- 
vestment and between trade and international movements of labor- 
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ultimate objective of  pushing the world economy toward greater effi- 
ciency. And, finally, because goods and services are inextricably (and 
increasingly) intertwined in real transactions, progress on merchandise 
trade  will  surely  be  slowed  unless  trade negotiators begin to think 
seriously about services too. 
Notes 
The author is indebted  to Robert E. Baldwin  and J. David  Richardson  for 
helpful  suggestions,  to Robert E. Lipsey  and  Irving B.  Kravis  for detailed 
comments on an earlier version of  the paper, and to the Ford Foundation for 
research support. 
1. With a few minor exceptions, the rules of the GATT currently apply only 
to merchandise trade. Outside the GATT framework, long-established regimes 
govern international competition  in some specific service activities,  such as 
ocean shipping and air transport. However,  cartelization  rather than liberal- 
ization has been the dominant theme. In a few other cases, such as telecom- 
munications, there are sector-specific bodies dealing primarily with regulatory 
and  technical  issues  and only  incidentally  with  barriers to trade. Also  see 
Stalson 1985, 30-36. 
2. See U.S. Trade Representative 1983. This is the national study submitted 
to the GATT by the United States in December  1983. 
3. In U.S. statistics for the domestic economy, “services” are usually defined 
to include all  sectors except manufacturing,  construction, mining, and  agri- 
culture. Balance of payments  accounting conventionally  divides current ac- 
count transactions into merchandise  trade and  “invisibles.”  The “services” 
added to merchandise trade to form the broader “goods and services” balance 
in the U.S.  international accounts are income from foreign investments, mil- 
itary transactions, travel and transportation, and “other services.”  (The re- 
maining category of  “invisible”  transaction is unilateral transfers.) The U.S. 
Department of  Commerce uses the term business services  to refer to travel, 
transportation, and  “other  services”  as recorded in the  U.S. international 
accounts. 
4. In a footnote to a statement by the Committee on Changing International 
Realities of  the National Planning Association  endorsing Stalson’s generally 
favorable assessment of the prospects for U.S. negotiations on service issues, 
John C. Carroll of the Communications Workers of  America writes, “I some- 
times feel that it is a disservice to the public interest to use the code words of 
‘barriers to trade in services’ to fight for the foreign interests of a handful of 
large construction, banking, and insurance firms”  (Stalson 1985, 7). 
5. Optimism about the outcome of trade negotiations almost always reflects 
a belief that the nation’s exports will increase more than its imports. Progress 
toward liberalization  thus typically rests on the shaky foundation of mercan- 
tilistic goals and inconsistent expectations, rather than an accurate perception 
of  mutual gains to be achieved through expansion of both exports and imports 
along lines of comparative advantage. 
6. See, for example, U.S. International Trade Commission 1982. The Office 
of Technology Assessment regards prospective direct benefits from expanded 
service exports as modest  but  acknowledges  the possibility  that exports of 403  International Competition in Services 
goods may follow from sales of services such as engineering and construction 
contracts (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1986, 5). 
7. Based  on an analysis  of  recent job creation in the United  States, the 
Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO concluded  that service occu- 
pations  “experiencing  the largest net growth in the number of jobs demand 
little skill, are only weakly organized into unions, and usually offer little pay- 
ranging from building custodians to fast food workers. . . . prospects for up- 
ward  mobility out of these lower rung jobs . . . are slight”  (AFL-CIO 1984, 
11 -  12). However, other researchers view growing service-sector employment 
in a more favorable light. For example, see Lawrence 1984 and Urquhart 1984. 
8. However,  trade-related  investment  policies  have also been ranked high 
on the agenda for the new GATT round by U.S. trade negotiators,  along with 
a third “new” issue, protection of intellectual property. 
9. See table 6.3. Construction, considered a service activity in the interna- 
tional accounts of the United States, is included in the goods-producing sectors 
in the tabulation of domestic employment by industry. 
10. For more extensive discussion of the distinguishing properties of services 
as economic activities, see Bhagwati  1984; Deardorff 1985; Gray 1983; Kravis 
1983; Sampson and Snape 1985; and Stern and Hoekman  1986. 
11. A large part of the theoretical literature on international trade deals with 
the extent to which indirect exchange of factors via trade can achieve the same 
efficiency benefits in production and consumption as free international move- 
ments of the factors themselves. 
12. The following discussion is based on Stern and Hoekman 1986. 
13. What is technologically required needs to be distinguished from what is 
cost efficient or profitable. This distinction is elaborated in the examples below. 
14. Most analyses of  international  competition  in  services  exclude factor 
services, that is, the employment abroad of  a country’s labor or capital by a 
foreign firm. 
15. The theory of comparative advantage explains the source of mutual gains 
to nations from international trade and, in particular, shows that a nation can 
gain from trade even if  it is  at an absolute disadvantage  in all  productive 
activities. The theory of  comparative advantage does not suggest that every 
resident of a given nation will be made better off by trade. Actual trade flows 
are determined  by  international  competitiveness, of  which  comparative ad- 
vantage is just one element, along with exchange rates and national policies. 
Comparative  advantage is a reliable predictor of a nation’s trade flows only 
when exchange rates are consistent with globally balanced trade and the in- 
fluence of trade-distorting  policies is minor. 
16. “Large” refers here to the size of the market for a given product. This 
tendency has been termed “false comparative advantage” by Lancaster 1979. 
Also see Helpman and Krugman 1985, 152. 
17. This problem was discussed by Frank Graham more than half a century 
ago. For a modern treatment, see Helpman and Krugman  1985. 
18. Housing services in table 6.8 include the imputed rental value of owner- 
occupied housing, but transportation services does not include a similar im- 
puted value for motor vehicles. 
19. This definition is the one used in the employment data published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Business services is sometimes defined more broadly 
to include all services purchased mainly by businesses rather than households, 
adding in particular business-oriented  financial and communication  services. 
Also, the U.S. Department of  Commerce uses the term  business services in 
its balance  of  payments reporting to refer  to all nonfactor  services  traded 
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20.  Like the broader services  category,  employment  in  business services 
includes workers at every level of skill. See Howe 1986 for a detailed assess- 
ment of  employment growth in the business services industry. 
21. Urquhart 1984. Men hired in the service sector were more likely to have 
worked in the goods-producing sector rather than not to have worked at all 
during the previous year. 
22.  A related issue is the extent to which firms in  service industries  earn 
rents, which are shared with workers through higher wages. Using microdata, 
Krueger and Summers (1986) show that most service industries are low paying 
even when  the usual  adjustments are made for worker characteristics. The 
exceptions include banking and insurance, industries that are characterized by 
substantial barriers to entry. 
23. Final demands are typically met by a combination of goods and services 
selected on the basis  of both income and relative prices.  Intermediate-input 
service needs are met by direct employment or by purchases from specialized 
service-providers. Again, the choice depends on relative prices. The observed 
long-term correlation between per capita income growth and the importance 
of  service employment necessarily reflects changes in relative prices as well 
as systematic effects of rising income (Kravis 1983; Kravis, Heston, and Sum- 
mers  1983). The same is of  course true for cross-country comparisons  in  a 
given year. 
24. Some developing nations are belatedly recognizing their strong compar- 
ative advantage in agricultural production as well as the concentration of pov- 
erty in rural areas. A few are attempting to alter domestic policies that have 
favored industrial production at the expense of agriculture. 
25. In practice, many service exports are misreported or unreported. Some 
service exports are bundled together with merchandise exports (e.g., computer 
equipment and software), For these, the total value of  the bundle is reported 
as a merchandise  export. In others including tourism,  reported amounts are 
based on voluntary surveys with low response rates. Some categories of service 
exports are estimated from conceptually flawed or incomplete data, while still 
others are simply omitted. For further details on measurement issues, see U.S. 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1986 and references cited there. 
26. The existence of scale economies is, of course, not unique to for-profit 
activities. Both health and education, largely organized on a not-for-profit basis, 
offer similar examples of potential benefits from “exporting” services in excess 
of the share in total revenues. 
27. The small GATT secretariat has remained an important voice for liberal 
policies, but these efforts have had  scant influence on the actions of  major 
nations. 
28.  U.S.  International  Trade Commission  1982, 4-7.  This document also 
provides information by industry for each of the fourteen service industries. 
29.  Krommenacker  1984 provides  an insider’s evaluation  of  the potential 
role of the GATT in liberalizing trade in services. 
30. The OECD has already  sponsored  considerable  consultative work on 
services. See Schott 1983 for an evaluation of OECD initiatives and the relative 
merits of proceeding within the OECD rather than the GATT. 
31. Such conditionality represents a departure from the central GATT prin- 
ciple of MFN treatment (nondiscrimination), under which tariff concessions 
made by any member apply to all other members. However, a similar approach 
was used  in  the Tokyo round  for the codes of conduct on specific types of 
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32. Strategies for negotiating on services are discussed in greater detail by 
Aronson and Cowhey  1984; Brock  1982; Gray 1983; Malmgren  1985; Stalson 
1985; and Sapir 1985. 
33. Not necessarily followed, but at least taken seriously. A good example 
is the prolonged effort by the United States to find a “GATT-able’’ variant on 
its  domestic international  sales  corporation (DISC)  device  for  subsidizing 
exports. 
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2. Maurice R. Greenberg 
The United States and World Services Trade 
My company, AIG, is the largest international insurance organization 
in the world-with  thirty thousand employees and $20 billion in assets. 
We do business in 140 countries and jurisdictions. In every one of them, 
insurance is a highly regulated activity; when governments even think 
about policies that affect trade in services, we feel the heat. 
Direct economic interest is one reason  I  care ,about services, but 
there is also another, bigger reason for my concern over trade in ser- 
vices. It is such an important area of U.S. economic activity, yet has 
gotten so little attention. We, as a nation, have a tremendous economic 
stake in  the health  of  our service sector-a  stake that is only now 
starting to be understood and appreciated. 
Unfortunately, we are well past the point  at which understanding 
and appreciation are enough. As in other trade areas, the growth of 
intense worldwide competition and the spread of nontariff barriers have 
hurt U.S. economic interests in services trade-and  will continue to 
hurt us in the absence of firm, direct, and immediate action on our part 
and on the part of our principal trading partners. 
My feelings of alarm are not eased when a labor leader describes the 
service economy as fast food and video games; when the head of one 
of  the world’s biggest banks describes the  service economy as one 
where we take in  each other’s laundry; when  a former presidential 
candidate describes the service economy as one where Americans serve 
hamburgers and sweep floors. 
One of the reasons services have gotten such short shrift is that they 
are hard to understand. What is a “service”  anyway? You cannot see 
it, touch it, store it, or measure it in any meaningful way that is also 
easily understood. We  are dealing here with a “product”-in  quotes- 
that is really a process; something that was once integral to the pro- 
duction and distribution of goods-organizing inputs, throughputs, and 
outputs-that  has  been  broken  away into any  number of  separate, 
distinct, profit-producing activities. 
A lot of service industries have been around for a long time. In my 
own business, even Lloyd’s was a latecomer: insurers were writing 
covers on caravan goods when Hammurabi ruled Babylonia four thou- 
sand years ago. What makes today different is the rapid growth of the 
telecommunications infrastructure, the integration of the world’s cap- 
ital  markets, and  the shifting basis  of  comparative advantage from 
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Today, we talk routinely of  world cars, outscourcing, and focused 
manufacturing as if  they had been  around forever. In fact, they are 
recent  developments, made possible  by the vast, technology-driven 
expansion of the service sector. Microchips and microwaves have given 
us the ability to allocate and manage resources globally, on a scale and 
to an extent that none of us could have imagined when John Kennedy 
was president. 
That ability to deliver services globally has, in turn, fueled economic 
transformation and division of  labor on a global scale-a  degree of 
economic integration that boggles the mind, occurring at a pace that 
leaves us breathless.  In turn, this quantum leap in  economic devel- 
opment has both multiplied demand for services and dramatically in- 
creased supply of the necessary ingredients for a modern service econ- 
omy-technology,  expertise, and capital. 
World trade figures reflect this fundamental change. In 1976, service 
transactions represented just over one-quarter of total world trade; in 
1985, they accounted for 30 percent. 
At the same time, the U.S. position in worldwide services trade has 
slipped significantly in a number of ways. For one thing, the dramatic 
growth in service exports-over  400 percent between 1970 and 1980- 
has  come to a grinding halt.  Since 1980, our exports, measured in 
current dollars, have grown only 26 percent-that  is actually a net loss 
of almost 8 percent when corrected for inflation. 
We have also seen significant erosion of our market share. Up through 
the early  1970s, U.S. service exports accounted for a dependable 25 
percent of the worldwide total. In recent years, they have averaged 20 
percent or less. 
To  our credit, services-including  investment income-have  been 
our best trade performer. In every year since 1972, services have shown 
a surplus. In five of those years, the surplus was even big enough to 
offset deficits in the merchandise account. That, of course, was when 
our merchandise deficits were a small fraction of their present size. 
A lot of  the glimmer fades, however, when we take a closer look. 
For one thing, our overall trade performance is deteriorating signifi- 
cantly. Since 1981, when we hit a high of $41 billion, our overall surplus 
has steadily fallen to its current level of around $24 billion. 
Most of  the decline comes not from eroding exports, but from ex- 
plosive growth in service imports-growth  that is likely to continue. 
Our transformation to net debtor status is going to increase that pres- 
sure, since every penny of the interest we pay to our foreign creditors- 
and every penny of profit on U.S. operations they repatriate-counts 
as a service import. 
But most disturbing of all is the deterioration of our trade in business 
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on-the  growth industries of the service sector. In 1981, our peak year, 
business services generated a surplus of $10 billion. In 1985, that figure 
was down to less than half a billion. Last year’s numbers could well 
show deficit. Stated in other terms, our share of that market has fallen 
from almost 15 percent in 1973 to  just under 8 percent in 1984. However 
you look at it, we are not in good shape. 
Before we all get terminally depressed, however, let me hasten to 
point out that these numbers are, at best, imprecise. Despite the best 
efforts of that huge statistical machine in Washington, we know very 
little about our true performance. 
Nobody ever paid very much attention to giving services their due. 
We  were a manufacturing economy at the end of World War II-or at 
least we thought we were-and  statistically speaking we were going to 
stay a manufacturing economy. Last September, the congressional Of- 
fice of Technology Assessment suggested that our service exports be- 
tween  1982 and  1984 may have been underestimated by as much as 
$128 billion, but nobody  really knows, because nobody keeps close 
track of the numbers. 
How can we make policy if  we do not know what we are dealing 
with? 
One thing I do know, and which we all know without a doubt, is that 
the United States is very much a service economy-with  all due respect 
to the labor leader, banker, and presidential candidate I quoted earlier. 
Well over two-thirds of our GNP comes out of services. Three-quarters 
of our work force is directly employed in service industries: the actual 
proportion probably exceeds 90 percent when we include service em- 
ployees in the goods-producing sector-managers,  planners, account- 
ants, R&D personnel, and so on. Forty percent  of our exports are 
services; a quarter of our imports are services. 
America’s overwhelming national interest in the strength of the service 
sector is self-evident. Service industries have a critical role to play not 
only in contributing to the vitality of our international economic perfor- 
mance but also-and  perhaps especially-in  enhancing the efficiency  and 
global competitiveness of our goods-producing industries as well. 
One way we can work toward strengthening our service sector is by 
improving our ability to compete in the global marketplace for services. 
There is nothing fundamentally wrong with the U.S. service sector. 
Our technological base, our human resource base, and our access to 
capital are second to none. Indeed, if anything, the vastness and com- 
plexity of our domestic marketplace have given us a substantial lead 
in the learning curve of resource allocation and infrastructure man- 
agement that lie at the core of service activities. 
So why haven’t we been able to translate that head start into sus- 
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protectionism. By their very nature, services are among the world’s 
most closely regulated economic activities. Traditionally, governments 
have granted themselves tight control over access to their financial, 
communications, and internal transport markets. 
That is all well and good, so long as a national government is willing 
and able to live in isolation from the rest  of the world community. 
Maybe Albania can do that, but I cannot think of many others. The 
fact is that  the integration  of  world markets, deregulation, and the 
wholesale privatization of former public and quasi-public monopolies 
have effectively demolished whatever rationale may have existed for 
constraints on market access in most, if not all, nonmilitary economic 
activities. 
Yet such constraints not only exist, but have grown perniciously over 
the last several years. As in merchandise trade, trade in services has 
become a viper’s nest of governmentally inspired economic distortion 
and obstruction at every turn.  Not that this is surprising: increased 
competition is a natural and predictable consequence of the substantial 
and continued growth in both the demand for services and capacity I 
noted earlier. 
The problem is that this license to obstruct with impunity is a direct 
result of the exclusion of services from the multilateral trading regime. 
And  it  is hurting the  United  States and others committed to open 
markets. 
Without negotiated rules, we are left with an ad hoc system of ex- 
pedient means based on the narrowest of national interests. Now, I am 
certainly not arguing against self-interest: if  anything, self-interest is 
the only thing that lets agreements work. What I am arguing against is 
short-term, unilateral action that inevitably leads to long-term, multi- 
lateral conflict. 
Obviously, we have made some progress. The Reagan administra- 
tion’s successful effort to get services onto the GATT agenda has built 
a strong multilateral consensus on the need for negotiated rules and 
set a major precedent as well. At the same time, however, we cannot 
forget that last September’s success at Punta del Este came only after 
six years of incessant jawboning and arm-twisting on the part of William 
Brock, Clayton Yeutter, and dozens of others in every forum imaginable. 
One voice that made a great deal of  difference is the Coalition of 
Service Industries, a group formed in 1982, which I served as chairman 
until last year. The purpose of the coalition is to build public awareness 
of the role of service industries in the U.S. economy and to speak out 
on public policy issues affecting the U.S.  service sector. 
So far, we have done well. Among other things, the coalition sup- 
ported passage  of  the Omnibus  Trade  Act  of  1984, made  a  strong 
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Economic Summit and to completing the US.  National Study on Ser- 
vices, and experienced success at Punta del Este. 
However, let me also emphasize that our initiative, precedent-setting 
though it was, is still only an agenda victory. If the Kennedy and Tokyo 
rounds are any indication, we are not going to see Draft Codes, let 
alone signed agreements, for a long time-perhaps,  if things go well, 
by the turn of the century. 
This is not to dismiss GATT. It is an organization that has contributed 
a great deal to our trading system and still has an important contribution 
to make. But its potential for contribution may not be strongest in the 
services area. I would much rather see a series of linked bilateral or 
multilateral agreements that could eventually be integrated into a broader 
multilateral code subject to further negotiation in the GATT forum, 
Certainly the constituencies exist. As a key player in services, Japan 
was the first to support our initiative. The United Kingdom has also 
understood its stake in services-what  they call “invisible trade”-for 
a long time. As a result of  the national studies on services mandated 
by the GATT ministerial conference in  1982, we have discovered that 
France is an even bigger exporter of services than the United Kingdom: 
as a whole, EEC service exports are more than three times the size of 
ours. And speaking of blocs, the ASEAN countries are also starting 
to recognize their stake in services. I think most of those governments 
would be willing to negotiate under the right conditions. 
The executive power exists:  The Omnibus Trade Act of  1984 not 
only opened the way for bilateral sectoral trade agreements in services 
and investment; it also strengthened the president’s power to impose 
sanctions for unfair trade practices in services. 
And there are precedents as well:  a few years ago, for example, 
Canada offered to open negotiations around a sectoral free trade agree- 
ment on traded computer services, and services are included in the 
US.-Israel free trade agreement of 1985. 
If  we can build a framework of bilateral agreements on a services 
regime, we will  be more than halfway-much  more than halfway- 
toward full GATT sanction. But before we can enter into any kind of 
international negotiations, we have to get our own act together and that 
is not going to be easy. 
The first thing we must do is decide that we are going to speak with 
one voice and then execute the decision. Right now, there are at least 
five executive branch departments that have some say over trade pol- 
icy-Commerce,  Agriculture, State, Defense, and the trade represen- 
tative’s office. A few years ago, Donald Regan and Malcolm Baldridge 
floated the idea of a Department of Trade, but it died. Recently, Dan 
Rostenkowski raised the idea again as part of his trade bill. I think we 
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Another necessary step is beefing up our collection and analysis of 
service-sector economic data. The Omnibus Trade Act of  1984 man- 
dated such changes, but the various departments have been slow to 
respond. Three years after the act’s passage, for example, it is still 
impossible to get more than the sketchiest annual figures on trade in 
business  services.  We  will  not  be  able to make  realistic, workable 
policy. 
The last thing we have to do before we sit down at the negotiating 
table is to make some fundamental decisions about the kind of agree- 
ments we want and then adopt appropriate strategy and tactics. If we 
want a single broad agreement, we have to decide that. If we want a 
“constitution”  for services trade that sets out some general rules, plus 
a series of sectoral codes that can be signed, we have to decide that 
too. The one thing we cannot do is go in unprepared and negotiate ad 
hoc . 
There are a number of pressing issues on the services agenda. From 
my perspective, the most pressing of these is national treatment-the 
right of foreign service businesses to receive fair and equal treatment 
under the laws of the host country. At present, governments can, and 
do, discriminate  against  service businesses in  ways  that are clearly 
prohibited in the agreements that govern trade in goods. Those prac- 
tices seriously impair our ability to compete on a level playing field. 
Discrimination can take place in many forms: the most common are 
in fiscal policy, taxation, and government procurement practices. Dis- 
criminatory  fiscal policy generally works by  setting up unequal and 
onerous requirements for foreign businesses.  In some countries, for 
example, foreign insurers are obliged to make deposits of assets that 
are not required of domestic insurers-in  situations that the government 
specifies. 
Taxation is also an easy way to discriminate. In several European 
countries, foreign insurers are required to pay taxes on premium in- 
come, while domestic companies pay taxes on profits. In another Eu- 
ropean country, premium taxes can be 400 percent greater for foreign 
insurers than for their domestic competitors. 
One of the great successes of the Tokyo round was the agreement 
on rules for opening up government procurement of merchandise. We 
need the same thing in services. Today, foreign insurers are still me- 
thodically shut out of  the bidding on government-sponsored projects, 
both at home and in third countries. They are systematically excluded 
from subsidized or guaranteed government export credits-even when 
those credits can benefit domestic industries. 
Nor is the insurance industry alone. Any number of  industry and 
government surveys show that other service industries face the same 
kinds of discriminatory and unequal treatment in foreign markets. To 413  International Competition in Services 
counteract this, we have to insist that any agreement guarantees, to 
the largest extent possible, the right of market access and the principles 
of transparency and national treatment. 
In conclusion, I want to reemphasize the need for negotiated rules 
on trade  in  services. Such an agreement would benefit not just the 
service sector but every sector of the U.S. economy-manufacturing, 
mining, and agriculture-by  improving efficiency and enhancing com- 
petitiveness. It would strengthen our trade position immeasurably by 
establishing a level playing field on which we can compete. And  it 
would make a positive contribution to the further integration of the 
world economy. 
Our success or failure at the negotiation table will depend on how 
we trade access to our markets for access to other markets. Most of 
our trading partners appreciate the size and wealth of  our economy 
and understand the implicit power of the leverage we possess.  It is 
time we understand and appreciate them as well. 
3.  Lionel H. Olmer 
The Role of Services 
A couple of hundred years ago Adam Smith, the eighteenth-century 
father of  classical economics (or so I am told by ideologues among 
Reagan administration policy officials past and present) is said to have 
criticized the role of services in the economy. He wrote that services 
are “unproductive  of  any  value  because  they  do not  fix  or realize 
themselves  in  any permanent  subject or vendible commodity which 
endures after labor is passed.”  A service, he remarked, “perishes in 
the very instant of its production.” 
I believe, to the contrary, that services are important and increasingly 
so. The U.S. economy  seems to be driven more and more  by  the 
services sector rather than by  manufacturing or agriculture, both in 
terms of economic output and employment. Indeed, the crown jewel 
in the Reagan administration’s display of accomplishments, the “great 
American job machine,” which has produced 13 million new jobs over 
the last six years, is a record of truly glittering proportions compared 
with  other industrial  nations,  particularly  those in  Western Europe 
where no new jobs have been added over a ten-year period. None of 
this additional employment has been in the manufacturing sector; vir- 
tually all of it has been created in the services: since 1980, retailing, 
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enced a 20  percent increase, and finance and real estate have each 
experienced roughly a 25 percent rise in employment during the six- 
year period. These three categories alone, retailing, finance, and real 
estate, now account for more than one out of every five jobs in America, 
while all services comprise three of every four jobs in our economy. 
Because there has been no increase in jobs in manufacturing, as the 
economy grows, manufacturing employment will make up a smaller 
and smaller percentage of the total. 
The role and significance of services in our economy are neither well 
understood nor accurately measured and evaluated. Part of this prob- 
lem stems from an archaic statistical system which has not kept pace 
with changes in our economy and does not provide adequate data. For 
example, an emerging pattern in recent years has been for manufac- 
turing companies to remove from their  direct-hire  payrolls  workers 
needed for custodial, security, and cafeteria services and instead to 
contract out to specialty firms for the performance of those functions. 
There might not be any net change in the number of employees, but 
U.S. labor statistics would reflect a reduction in manufacturing em- 
ployment and an increase in services jobs. The extent of this trend has 
not been  determined. On another level, and notwithstanding Adam 
Smith’s peroration, some services may exert a strong “pull”  on man- 
ufacturing sales; that is, the performance of a service, such as engi- 
neering consulting, may result in sales contracts for equipment specified 
as a consequence of the engineering service. This phenomenon has 
been experienced often in connection with large construction contracts, 
in the developing world especially. 
In the field of informatics, that is, the integration of  telecommuni- 
cations, computers, and related services, the relative value of software 
continues to escalate in comparison with hardware. Among some lead- 
ing manufacturers of digital telephone switching equipment-machines 
that receive, store, relay, and forward hundreds of thousands of tele- 
phone calls, computer linkups, and video signals simultaneously-fully 
80 percent of the cost is in the software that permits the equipment to 
operate, and only 20 percent of the total cost of production lies in the 
machinery. One switch manufacturer has told me his company’s ob- 
jective is to “drive  down the cost of the hardware to close to zero, 
and we have a good chance of reaching this goal within five years.” 
The production of the switching software for computers and telecom- 
munications equipment and the design of microchips and related tasks 
are classified as services. 
Finally, it can be said with some  justification that the world of finance 
has overshadowed the manufacturing sector in terms of overall impor- 
tance to national economies. Financial flows exceed the value of trade in 
goods by more than twenty to one. Finance is clearly the lubricant that 415  International Competition in Services 
makes possible the smooth flow of international commerce. In the ab- 
sence of credit, trade grinds to a virtual halt: over a three-year period in 
the early 1980s, U.S. exports to six countries in Latin America suffered 
a $17 billion decline mostly because financing  was simply not available as 
lending institutions panicked in the face of the enormous buildup of for- 
eign debt by these countries. The impact on the U.S. trading community 
generally, and in particular among export-related industry in south Flor- 
ida, was staggering. And so it is fair to state that financial services to a 
great degree underpin manufacturing jobs and the performance of U.  S. 
companies in international trade. 
Having declared that I believe services are increasingly significant 
yet not well understood and that their contribution to the manufacturing 
sector may be underestimated, let me now put a different perspective 
on the role of services in the U.S. economy. I shall make four points: 
1. The export potential of  services in relation to international trade 
in goods has been exaggerated, and thus the importance of services in 
the context of America’s staggering trade and current account deficits 
is being vastly overstated. 
2. The prospects are dim for achieving a more open and liberal regime 
of rules to guide world trade in services, as for example through the 
new round of multinational negotiations initiated in September 1986 
under the auspices of  the General Agreement on Tariffs and  Trade 
(GATT). 
3.  Yet  even if  a GATT  agreement  on services is not  possible  to 
achieve, say, over the next five years, and even though the value of 
services exports is relatively small, the effort to liberalize markets and 
regulations is still worthwhile. 
4.  The United  States, however, would be better advised to place 
greater emphasis on bilateral and sector-specific negotiations rather 
than on those that are multilateral and generic in character. 
The size and pervasiveness of the U.S.  trade deficit (we are now 
experiencing a deficit even in high-technology trade, a field in which 
we had long thought ourselves preeminent) has finally aroused the body 
politic and convinced virtually everyone in and out of government that 
the United States has a severe problem. The problem will not be cor- 
rected by market forces but through negotiation on an “even playing 
field” on which U.S.  businessmen are allowed to compete on terms 
equivalent to those permitted to foreigners in the U.S. marketplace. 
Nor will it be solved merely by encouraging faster economic growth 
in major industrialized countries or by some magic stroke that would 
eliminate the debt and interest payment obligations of less developed 
countries so that they could, presumably, buy more U.S.  goods and 
services.  No,  the realization  has taken  hold  that  the  United  States 
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Some argue that, in the end, accounts will balance “because they 
must,” that when foreigners cease loaning money to the United States, 
the U.S. foreign debt will increase even faster (it is already larger than 
any other single country’s external debt and arguably within a few 
years will be larger than the combined debt of all other nations in the 
world) and the value of our currency will plummet, making U.S.  goods 
price competitive in both world markets and our own market. I am not 
so sanguine about this unhappy forecast! Price competitiveness is only 
one factor in the sale of manufactures: market presence, technological 
superiority, quality, and service weigh heavily in the decision-making 
calculus of most purchasers. In some sectors, once a presence has been 
established, it is extremely difficult to dislodge even with an offer of 
significant cost savings. 
Although statistics on trade in services are inadequate, and even to 
a degree misleading, an examination of our economic accounts is none- 
theless revealing of the relative unimportance and lack of potential 
contribution by services to the resolution of the overwhelming deficits 
we confront. The most comprehensive yardstick of international eco- 
nomic activity is the current account, which includes the total of U.S. 
trade and other transactions in goods and services. The current account 
is comprised of five component parts: the merchandise trade account 
which measures the exchange of goods but not services; the business 
services account which is the aggregation of all services; the interna- 
tional investment income account; the other goods and services account 
which measures mostly government transactions;  and the unilateral 
transfers account which is comprised almost entirely of  payments to 
U.S. citizens living abroad. Table 6.14 shows how the Department of 
Commerce reports the performance of these various accounts for 1986. 
A closer focus on the 1986 business services account accomplishes 
two purposes (see table 6.15): it demonstrates that little comfort should 
be drawn from believing that success in trade in services will do more 
than contribute at the margin to a turnaround  of  our deficits; more 
important, it underscores the critical primacy of trade in goods and the 
burden on the manufacturing sector’ for any serious reduction in the 
current account imbalance. 
The point is that the largest categories in the business services ac- 
count have nothing whatever to do with the substance or rhetoric as- 
sociated with the popular discourse on services trade as the wave of 
the future.2  And the part of the account that does deal with insurance, 
engineering consulting, financial management, and the like amounts to 
a very small fraction of the U.S. trade picture, hardly enough to make 
a difference in the context of present and foreseeable economic real- 
ities. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that U.S. service companies 
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Table 6.14  Current Account (billions of dollars) 
Imports  Exports  Balance (- $140) 
Merchandise trade  398 (CIF)  228  -  170 
(- 148 FOB) 
International investment income  68  91  +  23 
Unilateral transfers  -  15.1  -  -15.1 
Business services  45.1  48  +  2.9 
Other goods and services  13.7  10.2  -3.5 
Table 6.15  Business Services (billions of dollars) 
Imports (45.3)  Exports (48.2)  Balance (+2.9) 
Travel  17.8  12.9  -4.9 
Passenger fares  6.8  3.3  -  3.5 
Shipping  16.4  14.7  -  1.7 
Proprietary rights  -  9.6  +  9.6 
Other: (communications 
services, contractor/ 
consulting fees, financial 
management, insurance, film 
rentals, etc.)  4.3  7.7  +  3.4 
example, !span becomes a more experienced international center of 
finance, as Korea increases its participation in international construc- 
tion projects,  and as the U.S.  share of  world patents  continues to 
decline as it has for a decade. 
The government  and industry  should make  substantial efforts to 
improve the performance and opportunity for U.S. companies to com- 
pete in these areas, but we must bear in mind the fact that services 
cannot  come close to bailing us  out of  our international  economic 
morass . 
GATT negotiation on services will produce results that are disap- 
pointing at best and possibly harmful if the United States grants conces- 
sions and assumes obligation in anticipation of equivalent commitments 
from its trading partners. This is not farfetched  if  one looks at the 
historical record of GATT agreements outside the realm of mutual and 
balanced  tariff reductions. The Tokyo round  of  GATT negotiations 
concluded in  1979, and one would be hard pressed to find many (if 
any!) in the private sector who would testify to the utility or value of 
the variety of nontariff agreements that those negotiations produced 
amid much-heralded and highly publicized fanfare (e.g., agreements on 
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nificant sales opportunities for U.  S. exporters nor dissuaded foreign 
governments from subsidizing national aerospace companies). 
Services trade is by its nature less amenable to multinational nego- 
tiations and agreement. Not only are the problems harder to define, 
but  they  are often unique  to particular  regions  and countries.  The 
“problems”  as we might see them may, from the foreigners point of 
view, not represent a problem or a barrier to the entry of nondomestic 
suppliers; rather they exist as a reflection of the history, culture, and 
custom of the local ~ociety.~  Moreover, the two fundamental principles 
of  GATT are national treatment, that is, the proposition that outside 
competitors will be treated the same as domestic citizens, and most 
favored nation (MFN) treatment, which makes available to all GATT 
members concessions granted to any. Often, national treatment is not 
enough to provide U.S.  suppliers with an opportunity to compete. For 
example, in countries where government policy that supports monop- 
oly services and paternalistic regulations represents the primary bar- 
riers to U.S. services trade, reciprocal market access would require 
those countries either to adopt the regulatory philosophy for the United 
States or to otherwise accommodate U.S.  concerns in ways that far 
exceed national treatment.  “Reciprocity”  is simply unacceptable to 
most countries as a comprehensive international standard. 
Telecommunications are much in the news. The United States has 
concluded formal negotiations with Japan on terms pronounced  “90 
percent  satisfactory”  by  segments of  the U.S.  industry.  Talks with 
Germany,  Italy,  and France, however,  continue with little  progress 
being reported and with high potential for major confrontation looming. 
Thus, the U.S. Congress, feeling increasingly pressured to do “some- 
thing”  about the U.S. trade deficit lest members be characterized as 
ineffective, threatens to pass telecommunications reciprocity legisla- 
tion. Supporters of such legislation, which would force the president 
to retaliate if bilateral negotiations fail, assert that the breakup of AT&T 
and the consequent opening up of the U.S.  telecommunications markets 
constitute a unilateral trade concession by the United States. Because 
most of the rest of the world chooses not to follow the U.S.  lead in 
deregulation, the only way to obtain foreign concessions is to negotiate 
accommodations of U.S.  grievances on a bilateral, sectoral basis. This 
is not compatible within the framework of MFN, and it is highly unlikely 
that any nation would open its borders to all members without assur- 
ances that each subscribed to and would seriously implement a world 
agreement. From the point of view of U.S.  national interests, we should 
become more comfortable with the policy of negotiating market access 
on a bilateral basis even in the face of criticism that it appears to lessen 
U.S. commitments to a multilateral trade regime. 
Private  sector companies with  major  interests  that  would be ad- 
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in services have done a superb job of maintaining pressure on the U.S. 
government. The administration has secured an agreement from GATT 
members to put services on the agenda when serious negotiations begin 
in Geneva, Switzerland, later this year. Had it not been for U.S. in- 
sistence starting at the ministerial level in 1981 and continuing through 
the start of the Uruguay round in September 1986, more delay would 
certainly have been the result of intransigence on the part of the leading 
advanced developed nations, most especially Brazil and India. (It was 
not long ago, 1982 to be exact, that the EC resisted U.S. blandishments 
on services and agreed only to “study”  the various issues. After four 
years of  desultory “study,”  the EC seems willing to accept services 
on the agenda,  although  this  should not be  seen as tantamount  to 
embracing the subject enthusiastically.) That in the final hours at Punta 
del Este a concession was forged and the United States achieved “vic- 
tory”  in the sense of incorporating services as part of the Uruguay 
declaration on the new GATT round should not obscure the long, tor- 
turous road ahead or raise unrealistic expectations for what might be 
achieved in the course of the next several years of  negotiations. Plow 
ahead we should, but with eyes wide open as to what the costs and 
benefits might be for all American interests and without encouraging 
the belief  that mere grudging acceptance to discuss services in the 
GATT is close to a great leap forward in U.S. export trade. 
The United States needs to press hard for greater market access 
throughout the many difference service areas and to insist on improved 
protections for intellectual property rights lest we slowly lose the pres- 
ent advantages and permit by abdication or ineffective negotiations the 
steady erosion of the existing trade surpluses in these fields. In the 
case of patents, copyrights, and semiconductor chip design (which was 
created as a sui generis right by the U.S. Congress in 1984 and which, 
by dint of strict reciprocal standards embodied in the statute, is slowly 
being emulated by certain of our leading trade partners to the great 
advantage of the U.S. high-technology community), tough negotiations, 
strict enforcement, effective oversight, and dispute settlement are more 
likely to be productive if pursued bilaterally among like-minded nations 
perceiving a shared interest in reaching a conclusion. 
In  summary, there is  every  reason  to push ahead vigorously for 
expanding services trade through the mechanism of the GATT, but to 
achieve faster results more meaningful to most U.S.  companies, we 
would probably  be better off  pressing hardest on a sector-by-sector 
basis with those countries most likely to perceive a benefit from reach- 
ing agreement with the  United  States. But we must recognize  that 
success in liberalizing services trade will be difficult to achieve and 
long in coming; above all else we should know that such success would 
not approach the magnitude of manufactures trade which must remain 
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Notes 
1. This burden on the manufacturing sector will become even heavier as the 
current account deficit continues to rise in the face of increasing interest pay- 
ments on US.  foreign debt and as remittances increase on foreign investment 
in the United States. Historically in surplus, or at least less in arrears than the 
merchandise trade balance, the current account deficit will grow to exceed the 
trade deficit this year or next. It represents roughly 3.3 percent of U.S.  GNP 
in 1986, and if U.S. foreign debt reaches $600-800 billion in the early 1990s, 
the current account deficit will approach 15 percent of our entire growth na- 
tional product. Merchandise  trade is the only area of  our trading economy 
large enough to make a difference in reducing the deficit. 
2. Articles in newspapers, congressional testimony by “experts,” and admin- 
istration witnesses  speaking on behalf of  services, perhaps in part to reduce 
pressures on other areas, frequently cite the entire business services account, 
which lumps together  all manner of  transactions into what appears to be a 
respectably large accumulation of trade-$93  billion in 1986. For example, in 
an op-ed  piece in the September 14,  1986, New York  Times, Leslie Wayne 
writes of services exports as “the new symbol of America’s grandeur abroad. 
They are the bright  spot in an otherwise bleak trade picture  [and] represent 
about one-third of the nation’s $800 billion-plus flow of exports and imports.” 
In fact, this “new wave” totaled $12 billion in 1986 with a $3.4 billion surplus, 
statistics that remain roughly unchanged. 
3. This is not to suggest that the United States should accept the status quo, 
but to make clearer that what we often see as a bamer is something of deep 
fundamental significance to the foreign country and that its elimination is likely 
to be several orders of magnitude more difficult (impossible?) than reducing 
tariffs. 
Summary of  Discussion 
Several issues in the negotiations for freer trade in services were dis- 
cussed. On the question of whether the forthcoming U.S.  trade bill 
would demand reciprocity or national treatment for services, Lionel 
Olmer explained that the administration report “Quest for Excellence” 
is a grab bag of ideas that does not make a clear statement on this 
point. According to  section  301,  the  absence of  reciprocity  can be 
grounds for the initiation of a trade complaint, but there is no definition 
of reciprocal treatment in the legislation, and in any case, Olmer con- 
tended, the presence of such a basis in law would be unreliable. 
The aluminum industry deals bilaterally with trade problems when- 
ever possible,  reported  Charles  Parry. GATT promises  to be a tidy 
solution, but in practice it fails. Services in particular will be a farce 
in GATT. Olmer defended the emphasis on services in the current GATT 421  International Competition in Services 
round as a justifiable  strategy for bleeding off  congressional protec- 
tionist pressures.  He noted, however, that Congress has become ex- 
tremely cynical about GATT.  Furthermore, the current GATT nego- 
tiations will not be over for several years, and any agreement on services 
will be very nonspecific in any case. Services should not be neglected, 
but should be placed in perspective with a realization that manufac- 
turing is by far the dominant traded sector in terms of jobs and the 
future health of the economy. Thomas Enders supported a pessimistic 
outlook for service trade negotiations, citing as an example the bilateral 
negotiations  between the United  States and  Canada, where  despite 
great  commitment  and  similar policies,  skilled negotiators,  minimal 
cultural problems, and a systematic attack on the issues, a major step 
forward cannot be expected. 
Maurice Greenberg rejected any analysis of  service trade based on 
available statistics, which he claimed are faulty. His personal experi- 
ence suggests  that  the value  of  service trade  is  much greater  than 
evoked by the data. No one suggests, according to Greenberg, that 
service-sector income will balance merchandise trade; both issues are 
important. He pointed out that there is international support for ex- 
panded service trade, particularly from the United Kingdom, France, 
and Japan and that India and Brazil form the principal resistance. He 
downplayed the doubts expressed about GATT, suggesting that it is a 
worthwhile forum for this type of negotiation. 
The discussion shifted to questions of the merits of bilateral versus 
multilateral and codified versus case-by-case approaches. Robert Bald- 
win suggested that even in the case of trade in manufactured goods, 
the codes of the Tokyo round were ineffective and the panel dispute 
resolution not satisfactorily uniform in outcome. In his view, bilateral 
approaches are a waste of time; a more promising approach would be 
to attack nontariff barriers in a multilateral forum on an item-by-item 
basis,  with  countervailing  duties  available  as  the  proverbial  stick. 
Greenberg agreed that nontariff barriers cannot be  codified and ex- 
pressed some hope in the application of the section 301 stick as a threat 
in bilateral negotiations. 
Thomas Johnson brought up the case of  the regulation of financial 
transactions, where the problem is not with London or New York but 
Tokyo. There is a complex set of institutional questions, due to the 
existence in Japan of a Glass-Steagall-type law. Licensing of U.S. bank- 
ing institutions to operate directly in securities markets is not prohibited 
by Japanese law, but the resistance has so far been insurmountable. 
U.S. regulators are helping, although the admittance by the Fed of 
three Japanese participants  as primary  dealers of  U.S.  government 
securities might not help because it removes the stick. The U.S. banks 
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On the question of the importance of  the exchange rate in service 
trade, Maurice Greenberg said that it matters only a little, since in the 
books the earnings or losses in foreign exchange are balanced out. 
Sebastian Edwards raised the issue of  what is to be considered fair 
game in service trade, wondering why  LDCs should not claim that 
housekeeping, for example, is a service. Rudiger Dornbusch suggested 
that Mexican dentists might want to fly to Texas for the day to export 
their particular service. 